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PERSIA AND THE POWERS

An Account of Diplomatic Relations, 1941-1946

by

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CHAPTER I

PERSIA'S HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

FOR a proper understanding of the recent momentous events in Persia which have brought that country so much into the limelight it is perhaps a necessary preliminary briefly to outline the salient points of its historical and geographical background as well as to sketch something of the character and culture of its people.

Persia, as it has generally been known, or Iran, to give it its official title, is a land associated with ancient civilisation, art and culture and with the great traditions upon which the foundations of modern civilisation are laid.

The word "Iran" denotes "the land of the Aryans." "Persia" is derived from the classical Persis, otherwise the province of Parsa (now known as Fars) in the south of Iran. This was the home of the Achamenian dynasty. The Iranis, as the Persians call themselves, are the direct descendants of the original primitive Aryan stock from which the Indo-European races, including the English, are descended. For centuries they were ruled by outstanding kings—those of the Achamenian dynasty (550-330 B.C.), the Parthian (248 B.C.-224 A.D.) and the Sassanian (226-652 A.D.). It was during the last-named period that the Persian Empire reached its zenith. During the Safavid period (1500-1722) Persia's art attained its perfection.

Famous Greek historians, poets and writers, such as Homer and Herodotus, have chronicled the part played by Persia in the ancient history and civilisation of mankind. The Empire at one time stretched from the borders of India and China to Libya and the Balkans.

During her memorable history Persia has experienced all the vicissitudes which have befallen great countries but one essential fact stands out and that is the capacity of Persians throughout every period to retain and reassert their main national characteristics and traditions in adverse circumstances. This was amply shown during the three invasions experienced by the Persians—that of Alexander the Great (330 B.C.), the Arab invasion (636 A.D.) and the Moghul invasion which took place early in the thirteenth century. In these catastrophes, particularly during the Moghul invasion, Persia suffered the

massacre, pillage and annihilation of her intellectual class as well as the loss of scientific, literary and philosophic treasures. For a time Alexander's rule brought with it the adoption of Hellenic forms of art, science and philosophy. The Arabs brought their own kind of worship, language, culture and way of life. It cannot be denied that these events have left unmistakable traces of their influence on the Persians and their present mode of life.

Persia, which covers 628,000 square miles (half mountain, quarter arid, quarter fertile) and has a population of about 15 million people, is a land of physical contrasts. Lying between the valleys of the Indus in the east and of the Tigris on the west is the Iranian plateau with mountain gorges, ravines, dense forests and deserts, rivers and fertile valleys, rich oil wells and unexploited mineral wealth. There are prehistoric remains and old cities with exquisite mosques alongside modern towns with wide boulevards, industrial centres and factories. The climate ranges from intense heat in the southern and central parts to extreme cold in the North, North-east, North-west and Western provinces. In the north the country is bounded by the Caspian Sea and the Caucasus, in the south by the warm waters of the Persian Gulf, in the west by Iraq and Turkey, and in the east by Baluchistan and Afghanistan.

Ever since the Napoleonic wars Persia has occupied a vital position in the politico-strategic policy in the East. Situated at the gateway to the East proper, it has formed one of the main pivots on which the whole strategy of the Middle and Near East turns. Moreover, Persia for the last 150 years has acted as a protecting bastion to India.

In 1798 Napoleon, fully realising the importance of Persia in his grand strategy of world domination and the break-up of the British Empire, despatched emissaries to the Court of the Shah of Persia to pave the way for the passage of the French Army to India. In 1807, following the *rapprochement* between Russia and Napoleon at Tilsit, the overtures of Emperor Bonaparte to the Shah's Ambassador at Finkenstein, and the despatch of General Gardane, the French Plenipotentiary, to the Court of the Shah, the situation as regards the position of British India assumed momentous importance. On 23rd October, 1807, *The Times*, discussing the question, observed that "the passage of French troops through Persia to India is among the gigantic projects of French ambition."

CHAPTER II

PERSIA AND THE WORLD WARS


DURING the nineteenth century the social and administrative structure of Persia functioned as a result of a conglomeration of autocracy, semi-feudalism and the rule of the clergy and it suffered from recurrent outside influences.

After a period of constitutional and democratic government which began with the (Mashruteh) constitutional monarchy of 1906, Persia's administrative machinery between the first and the second World Wars functioned on authoritative, centralised and fervently nationalistic lines unfettered by foreign entanglements.

Following the first World War the Persian Government was engaged in the painful process of evolving means for the unification and modernisation of the country which brought a multitude of problems in its wake. Those familiar with the situation in Persia after the first World War and who have witnessed the proud achievements of the past twenty years will readily agree that, in spite of some undeniable shortcomings, Persia was turned from a feudalistic country into an orderly and well-conducted State with international prestige.

Among the notable administrative and social changes brought about during this period may be mentioned: the disarming of turbulent tribes and the establishment of law and order all over the country; the curtailment of the mischievous influence of the clergy; the emancipation of women; the strengthening of Persian nationhood and the revival of self-respect; the vast development of general education; the construction of the Trans-Iranian railway and thousands of miles of serviceable roads, and the reorganisation of the national exchequer and the regular collection of taxes.

The outbreak of war in 1939 found Persia's national standing quite independent of the favours of the great Powers but her new factories, industrial life and economic structure wholly depended on the tools, machinery and shipping space granted her by these powers. Nevertheless, during the first eighteen months of the war the scene of fighting was far from Persia's frontiers and a course of neutrality was officially pursued. This neutrality, which was strictly adhered to by the Government to the best of its ability, was respected by the belligerents during the first two years of the war.



PERSIA

Germany's declaration of war on the Soviet Union on 22nd June, 1941, had a profound and instantaneous effect on world strategy in general, and on the fate of the British Empire in particular. No less was its lightning effect on the situation in Persia. With Great Britain stretching the hand of immediate friendship and alliance across the continent to the Russian people Persia overnight came into the limelight and was regarded by the Anglo-Soviet Governments as the only link in the chain which at that time could connect Great Britain and the Allies with the Soviet Union. It was seen that the speedy penetration of the German Army into Soviet territory and Caucasia had transformed Persia into a potential rear for the Soviet armed forces, that the strategic position of Persia in the Near East was enhanced, as it formed the Soviet flank and rear of the British forces in the East as well as the road to India and that the oil wells in the Persian Gulf regions were of vital importance to the British.

Hence on 26th August, 1941, British and Soviet armed forces entered Persia and because of the prevailing circumstances Persia's neutrality had to be abandoned. With His Majesty Mohammed Reza Shah Pahlevi on the throne a new democratic Government was formed by the late Mohammed Ali Foroughi, the veteran statesman and philosopher.

Negotiations were at once entered into by the Governments of Persia, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union to meet the situation. The new Premier, Foroughi, was backed and encouraged by the virile leadership of the new young monarch, who at the age of 22, suddenly had to ascend the Peacock Throne at one of the most critical moments of his country's history and to discharge the truly gigantic responsibilities that were abruptly thrown into his resolute hands. To the eternal pride and gratification of the Persian nation their young and democratic sovereign did not falter, and with clear foresight and mature wisdom guided his country through the innumerable hazards besetting it, when one false step might have done irremediable damage to Persia's future welfare.

It was the fusion of the innate genius of the young ruler, with the vision and discernment of the wise leader Foroughi, and the common sense of the bulk of the people, that guided the country's future destiny and adherence to the principles of the Atlantic Charter, and led to the strengthening of the bonds of friendship with the Allies.

Foroughi represented the true spirit and wish of the majority of the Persian people when, without hesitation, he offered the

hand of friendship to his country's two great neighbours, the British Empire and the Soviet Union, and after a few months, that is to say, on 29th January, 1942, his Government concluded a Tripartite Treaty of Alliance with Great Britain and the Soviet Union consisting of nine Articles and three annexes.¹

The Treaty of Alliance was acclaimed by the majority of the Persian people as a steadfast sign of faith and trust in the common cause which the Allies were relentlessly pursuing. It proved beyond shadow of doubt the friendship which the people of Persia had cherished for the consolidation of their relations with Great Britain and the Soviet Union on a sound and sincere basis and in solving the mutual problems which affected the three countries in equal partnership.

CHAPTER III

CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE ALLIED CAUSE

THE first step in Persia's collaboration with the Allied Powers was the severance of diplomatic relations with the German and Italian Governments and the expulsion of their nationals from Persian territory in the last quarter of 1941. Similar steps were taken on 12th April, 1942, against the Japanese Government. Thus Persia completely cut herself off from any contact with the Axis Powers.

From early 1942 when the machinery of Persia's collaboration with the Allied Powers started functioning an unprecedented era of co-partnership between Persia and her powerful Allies existed. Nevertheless, Persia's position *vis-à-vis* the Allies and the world political situation was somewhat anomalous. In order to rectify this and to be in a position to render still more aid to the common cause, Persia declared war on Germany on 9th September, 1943, and notified her adherence to the Declaration of the United Nations. *The Times* in a leading article on 13th September, 1943, commenting on "Persia as a Belligerent," described clearly Persia's position by observing that "the anomaly has now been removed and Persia takes the place which is rightfully hers, now and hereafter, in the ranks of the United Nations."

¹ See Appendix I.

Persia's main contributions to the war effort were:


- (1) Her strategic position.
- (2) Transport.
- (3) Oil.
- (4) Use of capital installations.
- (5) Food.
- (6) Supply of Persian currency.

These contributions can be dealt with in their sequence.

As to the first the importance of Persia in the strategy of the Middle and Near East has already been mentioned. Considering the situation in 1942, when the Russian Army were stubbornly defending the suburbs of Moscow and the foothills of the Caucasus, and when the Eighth Army were galvanising the whole world by defeating the Afrika Korps, Persia formed the only safe back door through which vital war supplies could be rushed to Russia. It was also the secure flank of all the Allies in the Middle East as well as the undisputed strategic defence of India and the Far East. A glance at the map will show the advantages accruing to the Allies consequent on Persia's alignment and friendship with them. Through its territory the British and American Governments could carry on undisturbed their splendid work of getting Lease-Lend materials through to the Soviet Union. The regular flow of millions of tons of precious oil which fed the British and Allied forces east of Gibraltar was now more than ever assured.

As to transport. The importance of the Persian route to the Soviet Union was in the fact that it was the only safe all-weather road to Russia. American ships had to detour West Africa and the Cape of Good Hope, and by a 20,000-mile voyage reach the Persian Gulf. British ships had to do almost half this mileage, and finally, by nearly a 1,000-mile trek on the Trans-Iranian Railway or by road, reach the back door of the Russian front. But it must be remembered that this was the only route immune—so far as war immunities go—from Axis submarines and aerial attacks. To this must be added the all-essential factor that the "Persian route" functioned in all four seasons of the year.

Some sixteen years ago the Persian Government put into operation an ambitious scheme of constructing a railway right through the heart of Persia, connecting Bandar Shahpour on the Persian Gulf with Bandar Shah on the Caspian Sea, a distance of 808 miles. Those familiar with the physical conditions in Persia will realise the immensity and the difficulties facing the construction of a railway right through the uplands



War Supply Routes

of Persia. The ruling gradient for most of the southern section—Persian Gulf to Teheran—is 1 in 67. The passage through the Khuzistan and Luristan mountains involved the most difficult work on the whole railway. There were deep gorges, some 300 feet in depth, through which ran turbulent rivers, sometimes with a depth of 30 feet. A number of viaducts had to be constructed in this section. Each one has a length of 427 feet and height of 82 feet. Many tunnels had also to be constructed. Of two 10-mile sections, 41 per cent of the first consists of tunnels—of which there are 18—with an aggregate length of 7,945 yards, and no less than half the second section, with 20 tunnels, totalling in length 9,111 yards.

The northern section from Teheran to the Caspian Sea is the shorter and somewhat easier from the constructional point of view, although the gradients are steeper and reach a maximum of 1 in 36 on the northern slopes of the Elburz mountains, which climb up to 7,000 feet. Spiral curves of 656 feet radius, many of them in tunnels up to a mile in length, had to be constructed. At the pass near Gaduk, leading to the inner Persian plateau, a tunnel two miles long pierces the mountain.

After just over ten years, the Trans-Iranian Railway was completed in 1938 and for the first time the north and south of Persia were connected up by a modern railway. It had cost the country altogether about forty million pounds. To get an idea of what forty million pounds means to a nation whose basic industry is agriculture and which is therefore not at all wealthy, it should be observed that the construction of the Trans-Iranian Railway started at a time when the total annual budget was about £3,000,000, and that in the ten years mentioned—that is, 1928-1938—the annual budget rose to its peak of about £30,000,000. It is therefore reasonable to say that a great part of the wealth of the whole Persian nation has been invested and sunk in the Trans-Iranian Railway.


I doubt if the authors of this gigantic scheme had any pre-conceived notions as to its vital significance in a global war, and the specific aid it would be rendering to the Allied Powers. The Persian nation are fully cognisant of the part their railway has been playing in getting war supplies to the U.S.S.R. and in helping to prevent the spread of the horrors of war to their territory. They are happy to have been of such singular service to the British, American and Russian people.

A similar story can be told in connection with the network of roads and highways of Persia, which have formed a second link in the transport problem of the colossal Lease-Lend material

going through Persia to Russia. Thousands of miles of good, serviceable roads were in use day and night by British and American trucks carrying Lease-Lend supplies.

The Persian Government realised the importance of Lease-Lend materials reaching the Soviet Union on the largest possible scale and in the most expeditious manner totally sacrificed the internal requirements and the vital transport needs of Persia and placed at the disposal of the Allied Powers the whole system of road and railway facilities.

Thousands of wagons and trucks which normally served to feed the Persian people were utilised for this purpose. Naturally,



Territory Covering the British Oil Concession in Persia

for a time food shortages were experienced in certain parts of the country, especially when the abundant products of the fertile regions of the north could not reach the central and other parts of the country. It must, however, be stated that when the food situation became acute the Allies showed active good will and displayed sympathetic understanding of the hardships which the Persian people experienced during the last four years because of the war situation in general. The British Government, in spite of limited shipping space, imported into Persia thousands of tons of wheat and accorded other aids and

facilities to alleviate the rather difficult situation. In view of the many essential calls on limited shipping space at the disposal of the British Government and the urgency of getting war supplies through to Russia, the difficulties were inevitable, and at times, with all the good will of the parties concerned, the ultimate results were somewhat hampered. Nevertheless the efforts made steadily improved the situation.

The important part that Persian oil played in the furtherance of the common cause need hardly be emphasised. The Persian oilfields in the south of Persia—the fourth biggest oil-producing regions in the world, which produced an output of crude petroleum of 13,274,243 tons in 1944 and a still higher production for 1945—supplied the necessary oil and fuel for British and American forces in nearly all the Middle and Near East and India, and even as far as China. The gigantic refineries at Abadan on the Persian Gulf and the oil wells in the Gulf regions were admirably exploited and administered by the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, who have, within a period of forty years, turned the vast arid parts in the regions of the oil wells into highly organised industrial and technical centres, with all the modern amenities of life.

The company, which holds a concession from the Persian Government to operate oil wells up to 1993 in a territory of 100,000 square miles in the territories approximately south of a straight line from Sulamanieh in the west of Persia, touching Kermanshah, Khoramabad, Saidabad, Bampur and Irafshan in Persian Baluchistan in the south-east of Persia, have always maintained amicable relations with the Persian Government who have in turn provided all facilities for the fulfilment of their great task. It is of particular interest that in 1944 the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, meeting the wishes of the Persian Government, entered into a new royalty agreement under which payments did not fluctuate but were limited to a minimum annual sum of four million pounds for the duration of the war in Europe. The Persian Government were most appreciative of this friendly gesture coming as it did at a particularly critical juncture when the country's financial and economic situation was beset with innumerable difficulties. It was considered as an effective help towards the strengthening of the relations between Persia and Great Britain as well as with the oil company.

The use of capital installations in Persia has been of the utmost service to the Allied Powers. These range from aerodromes, army barracks, telegraph service and warehouses, to

factories which have been producing many kinds of goods, small arms and aircraft parts for the Allies. These facilities were provided in spite of the fact that all such installations were essentially needed for internal requirements.

Food was another important item in Persia's contribution to the war effort. A good deal of the surplus grain, rice, cattle, etc., of the fertile northern, north-eastern and north-western provinces, which normally feed the rest of the country, were exported to the Soviet Union. Many thousands of Polish refugees who had to leave Russia were fed from the meagre stocks in the country, and this, combined with the inevitable difficulties of transport and distribution, caused a good deal of suffering to the mass of the Persian people.

Special arrangements were made between the Persian Government and the Allied Powers to meet the colossal expenditure of the British, American and Soviet forces in Persia, which ran into millions of pounds. Here again many natural difficulties arose, and it was feared that owing to the great expenditure of the Allies in Persia, and the spiral of prices chasing wages and vice-versa, inflation would swamp the country.

The circulation of paper money increased approximately sevenfold and the potential purchasing power of the people multiplied accordingly, but owing to scarcity of goods, prices rocketed sky high. Strict measures were taken by the Government to stop prices rising and effective assistance was rendered by the British and American Governments in importing gold to the country and selling it to the public in order to stabilise the currency and allay fears of inflation.

What privations this meant for the majority of the people will be realised when it is known that the cost of living was up by nearly 1,000 per cent. This figure, compared with the rise of the cost of living in all other countries of the world, made Teheran a most expensive city to live in.

The brief indications given here must be considered and measured only as a yard-stick of the good faith and sincere friendship of Persia towards the Allied Powers and in particular towards Great Britain, with whom the Persian Government have maintained diplomatic and friendly relations steadfastly for the last 150 years, in spite of some adverse circumstances.

The people of Persia, having full confidence in the unshakable resolve of the United Nations to respect the sanctity of the complete independence and sovereignty of small nations, joined their ranks with open arms and joyful hearts, not only because

of the double assurance that their independence and established rights would not in any shape or form be tampered with, but more so with the conviction that they were joining a just and righteous cause.

See Appendices III, V, and VII

CHAPTER IV

THE TEHERAN CONFERENCE

THE people of Persia following from a distance the ebb and flow of the war and the fortunes of the Allied armed forces, realised the desperate stakes at issue for the great democracies on whose existence the fate of small nations depended so much. The declaration of the Atlantic Charter and the exalted pronouncements of President Roosevelt and Mr. Winston Churchill on Allied post-war aims and purposes signified to the Persian nation which side they were on. It was not a question of choice. It can be said without fear of contradiction that nationalistically, ideologically, temperamentally, geographically and economically the vast majority of the people of Persia subscribed (and do subscribe) whole-heartedly to the concepts of the Atlantic Charter and the principles of enduring peace and justice which form the corner-stone of Allied post-war policy for which Great Britain and the United States of America sacrificed the flower of their youth.

In fact, the feelings of sincere friendship for the Allies felt by the Government and people of Persia cannot even by wilful distortion be considered opportunism. In the last quarter of 1941 and early in 1942 when German penetration into the foothills of the Caucasus was gaining fierce momentum and when the Libyan and Far Eastern situations were most critical, the Persian National Assembly, echoing the true spirit and desire of the majority of the people of Persia, ratified by 80 votes against eight the Tripartite Treaty of Alliance with Great Britain and the Soviet Union. There was approximately 86 per cent for the ratification of the Treaty, 8 per cent against and a very small percentage who did not vote.

Persia was the only country to link up with the Allied Nations at a perilous time in the war. Here was an 808-mile railway between the Persian Gulf and the Caspian Sea, and a network of serviceable roads connecting up the vital sinews of the great Anglo-American war supply system with the Soviet

battlefronts. Here was the source of millions of tons of precious oil and fuel for the war needs of Allied armed forces in nearly the whole of the Middle and Near East and India, and even as far as China. Here was a friendly and hospitable people, willing and anxious to help to the best of their ability the British, Americans and the Russians to final victory. And here in a global war was situated a military base second to none in importance in the grand strategy of the struggle.

Hence the choice of Teheran as meeting place for the Allied leaders, to concert plans for the prosecution of war to final and speedy victory and to establish the basis for an enduring peace, was a fitting gesture of the recognition of the vital part Persia had played since the beginning of 1942 in becoming the Bridge of Victory between the three Allied Powers. Just as Persia was the territory in which the arteries of the whole Allied war effort met, so in the last days of 1943 she formed the meeting place of the greatest plan for the prosecution of war and the establishment of universal peace and justice.

Marshal Stalin was the first Allied leader to arrive in Teheran. His aircraft, accompanied by four others carrying the Soviet Mission and a fighter escort, arrived on Friday, 26th November, 1943, at the Ghalemorghi Aerodrome (the Bird Fortress) on the outskirts of Teheran.

President Roosevelt and the American Mission arrived the next day (27th November) at Ghalemorghi Aerodrome. On the same day Mr. Churchill, Mr. Eden and the British Mission arrived at Amirabad Airport, also on the outskirts of the city.

As a gesture of friendship, President Roosevelt at the invitation of Marshal Stalin went to the Soviet Embassy the day after his arrival and spent the rest of his stay there. The conference was held mainly at the Soviet Embassy, with Marshal Stalin and President Roosevelt as full-time boarders and Mr. Churchill walking over from the British Embassy across the road.

On 1st December, 1943, the three Allied leaders issued the following Declaration on Persia:

The President of the United States, the Premier of the U.S.S.R., and the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, having consulted with each other and with the Prime Minister of Iran, desire to declare the mutual agreement of their three Governments regarding their relations with Iran.

The Governments of the United States, the U.S.S.R. and the United Kingdom recognise the assistance which Iran has given in the prosecution of the war against the common

enemy, particularly by facilitating the transportation of supplies from overseas to the Soviet Union.

The three Governments realise that the war has caused special economic difficulties for Iran, and they are agreed that they will continue to make available to the Government of Iran such economic assistance as may be possible, having regard to the heavy demands made upon them by their world-wide military operations and to the world-wide shortage of transport, raw materials, and supplies for civilian consumption.

With regard to the post-war period, the Governments of the United States, the U.S.S.R., and the United Kingdom are in accord with the Government of Iran that any economic problems confronting Iran at the close of hostilities should receive full consideration, along with those of other members of the United Nations, by conference or international agencies held or created to deal with international economic matters.

The Governments of the United States, the U.S.S.R., and the United Kingdom are at one with the Government of Iran in their desire for the maintenance of the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Iran. They count upon the participation of Iran, together with all other peace-loving nations, in the establishment of international peace, security and prosperity after the war, in accordance with the principles of the Atlantic Charter to which all four Governments have subscribed.

(Signed) WINSTON CHURCHILL.
J. V. STALIN.
FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT.

The whole of the Persian press as well as the Teheran radio hailed the visit of the Allied leaders, and all newspapers printed thousands of words expressing and emphasising Persia's spirit of amity and close relationship with Great Britain, the United States and the U.S.S.R. The principal newspaper, *Iran*, in a leading article on 8th December, 1943, describing the scene at the reception held by the Persian Government in honour of the Allied Declaration on Persia where diplomatic and Allied high officials were guests of honour, commented:

At the reception last night there were no foreigners. They were all Persians; they were all Americans, they were all British, they were all Russians. Last night the hearts of

the people of Persia became one with those of the Americans, the British and the Russians. They became one in fact and in purpose. No dissension or disunity existed among them. Only one thought dominated their minds and only one feeling ruled their hearts. That was friendship, sincerity, and collaboration—collaboration for peace and justice, collaboration for Victory and the common cause.

Three main streets in Teheran have been named after President Roosevelt, Mr. Churchill, and Marshal Stalin in honour of their first joint visit to the capital of one of the world's oldest civilisations.

The Allied Declaration on Persia was greatly welcomed not only for its intrinsic merits, but also for the wide portents for Persia's future relations with the Allied Powers. Viewed in this light, the Declaration could not but open many propitious chapters in the post-war collaboration between Persia and the Allies. The fact of Persia's sovereignty, political independence and territorial integrity were implicit before, but it was gratifying to the people of Persia that it should be openly and decisively affirmed by the three great Allied leaders. There is no doubt that the complete implementation of the facts and purposes of the momentous Declaration on Persia, endorsed so cogently at the Teheran Conference, would dissipate the legacy of any past misunderstandings and prejudices that may still lurk in the minds of some Persians as to the real motives of the Allied Powers, jointly and severally, in respect of Persia.

CHAPTER V

PERSIA TO-DAY

PERSIA, without having participated in actual fighting, has emerged from the second World War more profoundly changed than many of the Allied Nations. Her political structure, from a centralised, strong and stable but authoritative Government, has drifted into a succession of weak administrations ruled by various factions in Parliament, harangued by a vociferous press, exasperated by outside influences and now threatened with dismemberment. Her economic structure, enriched by the artificially beneficial expenditure of the Allied forces, has suffered from the dangers of inflation and the spiral

of prices chasing wages and vice versa. Moreover, the haphazard communications with the fertile northern provinces imposed on the rest of the country has damaged her economic development in no uncertain manner. Her social progress has also been hindered. There is no doubt that the major part of these set-backs is due to the presence of foreign troops in the country.

Since the entry of Anglo-Soviet troops into Persia on 26th August, 1941, followed by the conclusion of a Treaty of Alliance between Persia, Great Britain and the Soviet Union, the people of Persia, satiated with an authoritarian form of Government, have adopted with relief the amenities of democracy—this being denied to them for a period of over twenty years during the regime of the late Reza Shah. They have reconciled themselves to the inevitable hardships and privations which followed in the wake of the entry of Allied troops because of their genuine desire to help the furtherance of the Allied cause and the sincere adherence to the concepts of the United Nations.

The internal and external policy of Persia has been strictly synchronised with that of the Allies, and no efforts have been spared to consolidate, in so far as Persia is concerned, the existing bonds of friendship between Persia, her two great neighbours (the British Empire and the Soviet Union) and the United States of America. Successive governments have gone out of their way to gloss over Allied interferences in the internal affairs of Persia simply to avoid the slightest semblance of anti-Allied feeling. In fact some Persians accuse the various governments of the last four years of pandering to Allied wishes to the detriment of Persia's vital interests. They condemn the technique of palliating foreign infringements of her sovereign rights. Even within the ranks of those who developed a sense of guilt for the intransigence towards Great Britain, the U.S.A. and the Soviet Union during the reign of Reza Shah few remain who do not strongly censure the obsequiousness of recent governments towards the Allies.

Enlightened patriots, with adequate knowledge of world affairs, maintain that a subservient and over-zealous policy by Persia towards Great Britain and the Soviet Union, jointly and severally, would defeat its own object, and is liable to present a weak and unstable front to the powerful neighbours of Persia.

On the other hand there are small but well-organised groups of extremists, not necessarily unpatriotic, who advocate Persia's complete and utter alignment with one or the other of the aforesaid Powers.

There are the factions who are said to believe that Persia's foreign policy should be hitched to the British and American band-waggon. The adherents of this group are reputed to be genuinely alarmed by the spread of Communism and it is alleged they consider the Western democracies the only bulwark against the infiltration of Communism in Persia and the Middle East.

There are the followers of the Soviet Union who would have us believe that the salvation of Persia, nay the whole world, rests in the hands of the Soviets.

These two groups have formed strong opposing camps, and the daily struggle for predominance is carried to every phase of the political life of the country. And in a country like Persia practically every aspect of life comes under the umbrella of "politics." Powerful daily newspapers, weeklies, monthlies, influential statesmen and politicians, high Government officials, prominent deputies of the Majlis (Parliament) are all part and parcel of this dangerous set-up.

Successive governments have been pulled in opposite directions and eventually torn to pieces by one or the other side. Hence the lack of stability, apparent confusion of political issues, indecision, evasion of responsibility and general paralysis of affairs of State.

So far it appears that the so-called British and pro-American clique have mainly dominated the scene in the Majlis and have won the day. With Russian infiltration in the northern provinces, there is no doubt that in view of their steadfast resistance against Russian encroachment the prestige of this group will be enhanced, but their power and influence is bound to have a setback as professional political adventurers who supported the group for personal gains will try to desert what they consider a sinking ship to join the Russian merry-go-round.

Whatever charges may be levelled against the group in Persia who encourage the development of closest relations with the Western democracies, it must be put on record that they have never wavered from absolute loyalty to Persia, and at great sacrifice to their personal well-being, have endeavoured to uphold Persia's sovereign rights, territorial integrity and political independence.

During the reign of Reza Shah, in the year 1937, fifty-three persons were accused of having designs inimical to Persia's security and of maintaining illegal connections with foreign Powers. They were given long terms of imprisonment.

After the departure of Reza Shah a general amnesty was granted by the Persian Government to all political prisoners, and these fifty-three persons were released, upon which they formed the nucleus of the Tudeh Party, under the leadership of Soleyman Mirza Eskandari, a leading Socialist and a former Majlis deputy. Shortly afterwards Soleyman Mirza died and from that date onwards the Tudeh Party has been administered by a central committee.

At first a number of enlightened young men, and others who were dissatisfied with general conditions in Persia, saw in the Tudeh's clarion call of social justice the long-awaited answer to their prayers. They were soon to be disillusioned. The first big political issue arose in October 1944 when Russia demanded oil concessions. Tudeh adherents then came out in the open for Russia and abused the Persian Government for upholding Persia's sovereign rights. Gradually the genuine seekers of social justice migrated from the Tudeh Party, and new elements seeking political power at any cost took their place. Then recently the Tudeh Party in Azerbaijan put on its true mantle and changing its name to the Democratic Party began to dance to the tune set up for it from across the northern frontiers of Persia, demanding autonomy for that province.

The bulk of the people who are neither pro-this or anti-that are bewildered by all this passionate partisanship. Feelings of pessimism and frustration are widespread. The moderate right-thinkers and enlightened members of the community who realise the errors of the extremists, and have no foreign axe to grind, are aghast at the muddled state of affairs.

Herein, lies the crux of the Persian problem. It must be admitted that the truly patriotic people in Persia with moderate tendencies and adequate qualifications for leadership do not seem to be imbued with such nationalistic fervour as to put aside personal issues, form a united front, and guide the masses towards their rightful duties, and the country to its proper destiny. The dichotomy and divergence of emphasis by the so-called pro-Western or pro-Soviet groups in Persia is undoubtedly the direct consequence of the presence of Allied troops in the country, which in turn has resulted in interference of various degrees in the internal affairs of Persia.

No sensible Persian would deny that the welfare of his country is bound up with that of Great Britain and Russia, and that the question of political and economic co-operation between the three countries is of vital importance. In determining Persia's foreign policy towards Great Britain and the

Soviet Union, however, the foremost question must inevitably revolve round the sovereign rights, territorial integrity and political independence of Persia. Within this framework, Persia's internal and external policy can be aligned to that of her two great neighbours.

A dispassionate and non-ideological analysis, however, brings one to the conclusion that a rigid pro-British and pro-American policy, or an indiscriminate and fanatical pro-Soviet policy in Persia is in itself a betrayal of the common interests of every class, community or political organisation, and the price of workable and durable understanding between Persia on one hand and Great Britain and the U.S.S.R. on the other, must be a readiness on the part of these Powers to adhere strictly to the policy of non-interference in the internal affairs of Persia and the respect of her sovereign rights, and for the political factions in Persia to sacrifice such of their claims as prove, when examined, to be inconsistent with the common good of the country.

CHAPTER VI

RECENT EVENTS IN NORTHERN PROVINCES

RECENT incidents in Azerbaijan and to lesser degrees in Khorassan, Mazaneran and Kurdistan are not isolated illustrations of interference in the internal affairs of Persia. Ever since the end of August 1941 when Soviet troops entered Persia, Soviet authorities, contrary to Article 4 of the Treaty of Alliance (which says "It is understood that the presence of Allied forces on Iranian territory does not constitute a military occupation and will disturb as little as possible the administration and the security forces of Iran, the economic life of the country, the normal movements of the population and the application of Iranian laws and regulations") have in actual practice behaved as if they were in occupation of the northern provinces of Persia, and have interfered in one way or another in the internal affairs of those parts.

No foreigners, including British and Americans, have been allowed to venture in those parts, except on special passes, and anyone who has tried to obtain a pass knows what that entails. Even Persian officials have had to obtain permission for visiting the northern parts of their own country.

These interferences were at first on a small scale and Persian authorities turned a blind eye to them. After Stalingrad and the defeat of the German Army in the Caucasus, these interferences were gradually extended. On all such occasions, even at the height of Soviet provocation, the Persian Government have exercised the greatest restraint and tolerance, not wishing to upset the friendly relations with the Soviet Government.

The Persian people and Government felt that fundamentally their relations with the British and Soviet Governments were governed by the Tripartite Treaty of Alliance of 1942, the terms of which were clear and explicit as a guarantee of Persia's territorial integrity, political independence and sovereignty. Other issues were considered to be of secondary importance. In view of the hardships and privations experienced by the people of Persia and the sacrifices made by them for the Allied cause, all Persians were fully convinced that the three Great Powers, jointly and severally, were determined to carry out their obligations towards Persia.

The Tripartite Treaty of 1942 guaranteed territorial integrity and sovereign rights and promised economic aids; the Teheran Declaration reaffirmed all those undertakings. Moreover, the British, the Russians and the Americans had sacrificed the flower of their youth to fight the "evil things in life" and to safeguard the sanctity of treaties and international obligations. This outstanding fact alone had convinced Persians, from peasant to the King, that they need have no apprehensions about the future. The road ahead seemed clear and the prospects of Persia's future relations with the three Great Powers straightforward. The defects in the social, economic and administrative machinery of the country were easily discernible. It was hoped that after the withdrawal of Allied troops and the arrival of promised economic aids from Great Britain, the Soviet Union and the U.S.A., the country would be in a better position without foreign intervention to implement necessary reforms, and to repair the considerable damage caused by the stay of foreign troops.

Suddenly this journey through the fairy land came to an end, and Persia's relations with the Soviet Union seemed to plunge through a long dark tunnel, out of which it has not yet emerged.

The first clouds in Perso-Soviet relations appeared in October 1944 after the Government of M. Mohammed Saed Maraghe refused to grant oil concessions to the Soviet Government. The Russians, who appeared ill-advised about the true

feeling of Persians, took this to heart and considered the refusal as a personal affront to the Soviet Union. Moreover, Persia was accused of always siding with the Western Powers, of being ready to grant them concessions at all times, and to be seldom in an acquiescent mood towards Russia.

This, of course, does not correspond with facts. The Persian Government felt at the time that the grant of any concessions to foreign interests, so long as foreign troops were stationed in Persia, was incompatible with their sovereign rights. This applied to British and American interests as well as those of the Soviet Union. Great Britain and the U.S.A. did not raise any objection and concurred that the decision was entirely within the rights of the Persian Government. At this the Soviet Government showed intense irritation.

On 3rd December, 1944, a private Bill was submitted to the Majlis by Dr. Mohammed Mossadegh, the veteran Deputy of Teheran, prohibiting any Persian official from concluding an agreement with any foreign Power or interest in connection with any concession. The Bill was passed by the unanimous vote of the deputies. Russians considered this directed against them. This constituted the second contributing cause of alleged Russian grievances against Persia. Needless to say, the Bill was directed just as much against the Soviet Union as it was—shall we say—against Guatemala. In fact history may one day reveal that the resolution may have been essentially directed against the opposing interests of the Soviet Union.

On 14th October, 1945, the Majlis passed a resolution on its own initiative by a majority of more than 80 per cent, forbidding elections until after Allied troops had left the country. This is believed to be the third act which the Russians consider directed against them.

To any unprejudiced person it seems inexplicable that these acts should be interpreted as directed against the Soviet Union. It is also futile for the Soviet authorities to play the injured party and to suspect the Persian people and their true representatives of conspiracy against them. Persia has such a clear conscience that they would welcome a round table conference on the highest level with the Soviet Government at which they can ventilate their genuine grievances and Persia can state her rights. The Persian case is so simple and clear that Persians have no trepidation in allowing anyone to scrutinise their motives.

CHAPTER VII

PERSIA'S CASE

PERSIA'S case may be summarised as follows:

- (1) Persia is a sovereign, independent country.
- (2) Persia is not an ex-enemy of the Soviet Union; she is an ally and a friend who has rendered great and effective services to the cause of Russian victory. In the Teheran Declaration of December, 1943, the three Allied leaders recognised "... the assistance that Iran has given in the prosecution of the war against the common enemy . . ." and stipulated that the "three governments of the U.S.A., the United Kingdom and the U.S.S.R. realise that the war has caused especial economic difficulties for Iran and they are agreed that they will continue to make available to the Government of Iran such economic assistance as may be possible."
- (3) Persia is the only country whose territorial integrity, political independence and sovereignty has been guaranteed "jointly and severally" by Great Britain and the Soviet Union by Treaty. (Treaty of Alliance, 29th January, 1942.)
- (4) In the Teheran Declaration of 1st December, 1943, Marshal Stalin joined the late President Roosevelt and Mr. Churchill in reaffirming the territorial integrity, political independence and sovereignty of Persia.
- (5) Persia is a member of the United Nations and was elected as one of the fourteen countries whose delegates constituted the Executive Committee of the Preparatory Commission of the United Nations Organisation.

The Persian Government's case as set out in the plea to the Security Council mainly embraces the following points:

Interferences by Soviet authorities in the internal affairs of Persia are not merely trivial interventions which have occurred recently. Ever since Soviet armed forces entered Persia in August, 1941, Soviet military and civil authorities have in one way or another created flagrant breaches of the explicit pledges and undertakings the Soviet Government accepted in the Treaty of Alliance. These interferences, on a small scale at first, gained momentum after the victory of Stalingrad, until in recent months they have not only endangered the territorial integrity and political independence of Persia as well as her fundamental sovereign rights but now threaten her with dismemberment.

So long as the war lasted, Persia felt it was part of her war effort to leave Perso-Soviet relations undisturbed and not to concern the Allied Powers with secondary issues, but when Germany was defeated the Persian people and Government felt it was time that Soviet authorities in Persia lived up to the categorical undertakings solemnly contracted by the Soviet Government.

Interferences by Soviet military and civil authorities in the northern provinces of Persia where Soviet troops have been stationed have been constant, methodical and deliberate. Since the refusal of the Persian Government to grant oil concessions to the Russians in November, 1944, the interferences have in most cases followed a uniform pattern.

It is of particular interest to note that disturbances in Azerbaijan and the Caspian provinces came into prominence not long after this refusal by the Persian Government, while the Kurds in western Azerbaijan were incited to throw off their allegiance to Teheran. The broad outlines of Soviet intervention in these parts consisted mainly of withholding freedom of action to the Persian army, the gendarmerie and the police forces while the adherents of the Tudeh (alias the Democratic party), strengthened by "imported" undesirables and agitators from across the northern frontiers of Persia, fomented disturbances and encouraged peasants and labouring classes to disorder and rebellion. Those who have lent a kindly ear to the insidious propaganda and joined the Democratic party have been given food, clothing and shelter and allowed to conduct their trade or business. Many even have been supplied with arms. Others who have refused to fall in line have been compelled to leave the area.

Government officials who in the slightest way opposed such acts inimical to the sovereign rights of Persia or to the execution of their duties have been forced by Soviet authorities to quit their posts and clear out of the district. The Central Government in Teheran could replace these officials only by others "acceptable" to Soviet authorities. Thus, many provinces in the north of Persia have been for some time without governors and key government officials. Communications between the northern provinces and Teheran have gradually worsened until they are almost non-existent in many districts.

The Soviet High Command in Northern Persia has insisted that all movements of Persian troops and gendarmerie from one locality to another would have to be contingent on permission primarily obtained from Soviet authorities. It needs little

elaboration to realise the enormous difficulties that compliance with such an order would entail in a vast country like Persia, with the various tribes scattered all over the country and with inadequate communications. Repeated requests to Soviet authorities to despatch security forces to disturbed localities in the provinces of Azerbaijan, Mazandaran, Gilan and Kurdistan have either been refused by the Soviet authorities or so long delayed that minor disturbances have developed into major ones and many more troops needed to cope with the situation. Moreover, Soviet authorities on many occasions have prevented Persian troops and gendarmerie garrisons in various towns in the northern provinces from establishing law and order and carrying out their duties. Persian troops and security forces have been confined to their garrisons and the gendarmerie in the town forbidden to use their rifles, while major disturbances have been allowed to develop and to expand.

Persian officers of whatever rank who have resisted Soviet encroachments on their functions and duties have been packed off hurriedly from their posts by Soviet authorities and forced to return to Teheran. Thus even the commander of a Persian army division could not move even in his own area without a written permit from the Soviet authorities.

The Soviet authorities also prevented ammunition and military equipment belonging to the Persian Army from being moved from one place to another on Persian territory. Soviet officials stated that permission for this would have to come from Moscow.

The maintenance of order and security in the northern provinces has been jeopardised for lack of sufficient garrison forces. The Persian Government found it impossible to reinforce the troops already on the spot owing to the fact that the despatch of even one gendarme required the sanction of the Soviet authorities and this entailed such protracted formalities that the object in view was defeated before anything could be done.

There has been complete reluctance on the part of the Soviet authorities to allow any British or American officials to travel to the provinces under their occupation. No foreign correspondents have been allowed to venture in those parts.

These interferences did not stop at military matters. Soviet authorities have interfered in a similar way in the civil administration of the northern provinces. Anyone who in the opinion of the local Soviet official has been considered undesirable has been expelled. Even Persian civilian officials who for some reason or another caused displeasure to the local Soviet official were forced to leave their posts.

Owing to interference on the part of Soviet officials, the prosecution of criminals and offenders at law in Northern Persian provinces has been rendered most difficult. The Soviet attitude, in direct violation of Persia's jurisdictional freedom, by hindering the police and gendarmerie authorities from arresting agitators and rebels and by not allowing them to come to justice has created complete unrest and confusion.

Interferences in the civil administration of the north provinces have taken the form of opposing appointments of governors and other officials and dismissing and in some cases expelling officials disliked by Soviet authorities.

There have been interferences with the exercises of judicial authority by Persian courts and disregarding the inviolability of judges; arbitrary arrests and expulsions of private citizens who were not guilty of any unlawful acts but who had probably met with Soviet disfavour; interferences with the free movement of the population and passenger traffic and of food supplies and barriers erected at the entrance of the so-called Soviet zones in the interior of the country. The examination of passengers has been more rigorous than examinations carried out at frontiers.

There has been interference in the legal formalities by crossing and recrossing the frontiers of Persia. The journeys of Persian subjects to Soviet territory with political designs has been facilitated. A great number of Persians have been admitted to Soviet nationality in Persia by issuing them with Soviet passports.

The climax of the interferences in movements of Persian security forces came in November 1945, when the Persian Government decided to despatch reinforcements comprising two infantry battalions, one light tank battalion and one gendarmerie battalion with arms and ammunition to deal with the rebellion caused by unruly elements in the province of Azerbaijan. These reinforcements were despatched from Teheran and on reaching Sharifabad (four miles east of Qazvin) were stopped by Soviet armed forces who refused to allow the Persian contingent to proceed to their destination. The Persian Government immediately protested to the Soviet Embassy in Teheran on the 22nd and 23rd November, 1945, at this flagrant violation of Persian sovereign rights and a breach of the terms of the Treaty of Alliance and the Teheran Declaration. The Persian Government pointed out that it was their sacred duty and responsibility to maintain law and order on Persian territory and they requested that immediate instructions be sent to the Soviet Command to allow the reinforcements to proceed to Azerbaijan.

The Soviet reply to Persia's decision to send reinforcements to Tabriz was :

With regard to the fact that the Iranian Government have deemed it necessary to despatch armed forces to Azerbaijan for the purpose of maintaining security, as their arrival there at this juncture would cause disturbances and bloodshed and in the event of the outbreak of disturbances the Soviet Government would, to maintain security in the areas stationed by her armed forces, be constrained to complement her armed forces, and the Soviet Government is not willing to do so; therefore, the arrival of the supplementary forces of Iran is not, in view of the presence of the army and gendarmerie in those localities, considered advisable.

The Soviet Government's contention that the events in Azerbaijan are "a matter of aspirations with respect to the assurance of the democratic rights of the Azerbaijanian population of Northern Iran which is seeking national autonomy within the limits of the Iranian State which has this particular language different from the Persian language," does not correspond with facts.

The autonomous government of Azerbaijan is in fact against the constitutional law of Persia and inconsistent with the fundamental laws of the country. The so-called "Popular Assembly" of the rebels has no connection with and no similarity to the provincial councils provided for by the Persian constitution, the re-functioning of which was awaiting the withdrawal of foreign troops. The "democratic rights of the population of Azerbaijan" are assured by the duly elected representatives sitting in the Majlis. The suggestion that the incidents in that province have been caused by "reactionary elements" is a figment of the imagination as it is the rebel forces assisted by Soviet authorities who have by sheer force and mob rule put to death landowners, governors and gendarmes.

Apart from active Soviet support for the rebels and undesirable elements who had formed the autonomous Government of Azerbaijan, Soviet radio and press from Moscow and Baku sent out intensive propaganda in support of these elements.

The whole area was cordoned off so that the Central Government has been unable to exercise any authority and get in touch with their own officials. Even diplomatic representatives of the Allies have often been unable to obtain facilities from Soviet authorities to proceed to Azerbaijan.

Soviet military authorities have systematically prevented reinforcements from reaching besieged garrisons. What has

happened eventually is that practically every army garrison and gendarmerie post has been methodically disarmed, their morale broken and their prestige shattered. On several occasions arrested bandits and rebels have been abruptly released, their confiscated arms returned to them and the security forces who caught the terrorists imprisoned in their places. Therefore the arrest and conviction of brigands, rebels and disorderly elements in these provinces have been for some time abortive.

The province of Azerbaijan has consequently been sealed off completely from the rest of Persia, and every attempt by the Persian Government to retain control of the administration and communication with the province have proved unsuccessful. Just 24 hours before the conference of foreign ministers was due to begin at Moscow, the world was presented with an artificial *fait accompli* in the shape of the autonomous government of Azerbaijan.

It is superfluous to examine the real motives of the Democratic Party in Azerbaijan and their vociferous but superficial concern over the social conditions of the masses. Whatever shortcomings there may be in the social conditions of the masses, and in the social conditions of the people of the northern parts of Persia—and it is not denied that there are many—the solution of the problem does not lie in sowing discord and discontent among the various classes and creating disturbances, backed by foreign intervention and pressure.

Soviet authorities have also interfered in the economic life of Persia. Time and again the transport of foodstuffs from the fertile regions of the Caspian provinces to the capital and the southern areas have been stopped. Even after the termination of hostilities with Germany and Japan, Soviet military authorities have continued to maintain complete control at Bandarshah (the terminus of the Trans-Iranian Railway on the Caspian), and have controlled all goods and passenger traffic. Persian Customs officials and Ministry of Finance officials have not been allowed to exercise control over the transactions of Soviet authorities who have allowed passengers and goods to travel between Russia and Persia without observing Customs formalities and regulations concerning the import of goods, etc., into the country. Soviet authorities have also transported various kinds of materials from Persia to Russia. It is estimated that Soviet armed forces by the 30th December, 1945, had transported 111,070 cubic metres of timber in excess of the amount allowed them by the Persian Government.

The bland refutations of these charges by Soviet authorities bear but little relation to the facts. They are reminiscent of denials made by M. Sazanoff, the Imperial Russian Foreign Minister to Sir George Buchanan, the British Ambassador to St. Petersburg, recorded by Sir Austen Chamberlain in his *Politics from Inside*. Sir Austen Chamberlain in his notes dated April 1912, relates:

"I had some talk with our Ambassador in St. Petersburg about the Persian situation. He told me that he thought the Russian Government was acting quite loyally, but their agents on the spot disregarded their instructions and forced their hand, and they themselves adopted methods which did not square with English ideas. For example, the other day he had had to go to M. Sazanoff to say that Grey was greatly disturbed about the bombardment of the Mosque at Meshed by Russian troops, which produced a bad impression in England and a still worse one among our great Indian Mohammedan population. Sazanoff replied, 'But we did not bombard the mosque—we were very careful not to.' Apparently what they did was to spare the mosque itself and to throw shells into the crowded sanctuary lying all round it. On Buchanan pointing this out, Sazanoff said, 'But we have a letter from the priests thanking us for what we did and for the care we took of the shrine.' 'But Excellence,' said Buchanan, 'it really is no use your telling me that because I know that the letter was written in your Consulate and that the priests were forced to sign it by your Consul.' 'Still what does that matter?' exclaimed Sazanoff, 'it is just as useful and answers all complaints'."

CHAPTER VIII

THE ENIGMA OF SOVIET INTRANSIGENCE

IT is difficult to comprehend the intransigence of the Soviet Union towards Persia. There is no doubt that the Soviet attitude bodes ill for the future relations of the two countries.

Many explanations have been given by competent observers all over the world as to Soviet intentions in Persia. They are defined variously as :

A reversion to the Imperialist and expansionist Tsarist policy.

The establishment of a "friendly" Government in Teheran.

The constitution of a security belt for the Caucasian oilfields.

The keeping out of British and American oil interests in the northern provinces of Persia.

The complete eradication of British and American influence in Persia.

Closer proximity to British strategic positions in the Middle East in case of possible contingencies.

Using Persia as a lever to obtain other concessions from the Anglo-American bloc.

It is difficult to see how a security belt anywhere in the world to-day is going to bring about any security. It is related of Sultan Abdul Hamid of Turkey that in his extreme suspicion he set spies to watch the movements of his courtiers and high officials, but as he never trusted anyone, he would assign a second group of spies to watch the first ones and a third group to spy on the second ones and so on. This security belt plan is a vicious circle which once started will never stop. Moreover, such a dangerous idea will not pass unnoticed by other great powers, who in self-protection, will start a security belt in reverse, and we are too close to the catastrophes of this century not to realise what that entails.

These and a host of other contentions have been put forward by various people trying to fathom the enigma of Soviet moves in Persia. I do not profess to be in the confidence of Soviet authorities or to have the slightest inkling as to their true motives in Persia. I am not even impressed with the spurious contentions enumerated above.

Surely if such fantastic designs exist in Soviet minds, they cannot be directed against the Persians who have time and again during the last few years proved their friendship for the Russian people. Is it the suspicion that has divided the great powers since time immemorial and is making a pawn of Persia in the despicable game of power politics? It is a historical fact that every time there has been discord between Great Britain and Russia, Persia has been the first to suffer.

Russia has played too big a part in the second World War and has sacrificed too much to misunderstand the justifiable motives of the Persians in trying to protect their territorial integrity and sovereign rights. I feel sure that if the dark labyrinths of political intrigues and misunderstandings that have recently enveloped Perso-Soviet relations could be by-passed it would be found that the divergencies of interest in fundamental issues between the two countries would soon disappear.

Now concerning the matter of alleged Persian maladministration. A good deal is heard about the necessity of reforms in Persia and the allusion to corruption and maladministration. The original sources that have directed their strong, methodical propaganda machinery to impress the world at large with the desperate need of social reforms in Persia have obviously taken advantage of a situation there after their own heart.

Within the last forty years the people of Persia have fought and gained their most precious possession—the Mashruteh of 1906. They have witnessed the intrusion of foreign powers in their country, the use of their neutral territory by armed forces of all sides in the first world war, the regeneration of a spirit of patriotic fervour and progress during Reza Shah's reign, and, finally, the tragic breakdown of the centralised administrative machinery of the state, and later their alignment on the side of the Allies. The ground is now strewn with the wreckage of the last 20 years in general and that of the last four years in particular.

As an aftermath of the shock sustained, Persia is to-day in the process of recovering from a number of maladies, some psychological, some organic, some external and some internal. But the underlying causes go well back in years and fundamentally they can be traced to foreign intervention.

The point at issue is, however, the connection between the desired reforms and the Treaty and sovereign rights of Persia.

For over twenty years under the late Reza Shah, Persia's administration was run on a centralised and authoritative manner; all authority was concentrated in the outstanding person of the Shah. The difficulties facing Persia after the first World War have been so numerous and deep rooted that the twenty years covered by the reign of Reza Shah and the prodigious efforts made in that time seem to have been insufficient to establish a true and permanent foundation for a sound social and economic structure and a foreign policy compatible with the geographic position of Persia. The central local administrations were not moulded together in such a way as to resist an abrupt shock; hence in August 1941, when Anglo-Soviet troops entered Persia, the machinery of the central government suddenly staggered and weakened. Disturbances by turbulent tribes and unruly elements who had been biding their time at once took place, and the economic structure collapsed. The army, with lost prestige and wounded pride, found its painstaking organisation and labour of twenty years shattered overnight. A fierce mania for freedom of thought, freedom of action,

in fact, freedom of everything, suddenly became the toy of an inexperienced section of the people who had been held in tight rein for over 20 years.

The farrago of reaction which followed produced a sharp setback in the economic life of the country, against which the administration is still struggling. These unexpected developments have produced transitory reactions which have lent colour to Arabian Nights stories about Persia.

Fundamentally, Persia's memorable history—her recent history included—has proved that her people are capable in every sense of the word, of running their own affairs. Those who insist that the contrary is the case are misinformed, for when disorganisation has set in it has in fact been no more than a bubbling of otherwise calm waters caused by outside influences.

No one can deny that in the reconstruction of Persia during the reign of Reza Shah many mistakes have been made and many fundamental and vital issues neglected. Centralisation of Government authority was concentrated to such an extent in the person of the Shah that the whole system became top-heavy. But it cannot be denied that twenty years in the life of a nation is hardly sufficient for reforms to take root.

In the past the geographical situation of Persia has influenced her internal affairs to a great extent. This is no less true to-day. Since Napoleonic days Persia has occupied a vital position in the politico-strategic policy of the East. Situated at the gateway to the East proper she has formed one of the main pivots on which rests the whole strategy of the Middle and Near East. Persia's contact with the outside world has constituted a vital factor in the establishment of her law and order, her modernisation and social development.

There have certainly been periods of tranquility when the Persian people and Government have been left alone by foreign powers to feel their own way towards the multitude of tangled social problems facing them and to seek their own solution. Alas! these periods have been few and far between. Persia's foreign relations during the past two centuries have been responsible for constant setbacks for her people and these in turn have resulted in lack of security in the country, lack of centralisation, corruption and suspension of social development, fear among the simple-minded section of the people who have been apt to attribute almost anything that happened in Persia to foreign interference and the Machiavellian motives of the great powers, even when they were genuinely friendly towards Persia. The unfortunate Anglo-Russian Treaty of 1907,

dividing Persia into zones of influence, the violation of Persian territory during the first World War, the ill-fated Anglo-Persian Pact of 1919 which never saw the light of day, the entry of Anglo-Soviet troops into Persia in August, 1941 and Soviet interferences in Persia's internal affairs during the last few years, and now the Soviet refusal to withdraw their troops from Persia in accordance with the Treaty of Alliance—these have undoubtedly created mistrust and suspicion among the people.

The problem is not, of course, as one sided as it is depicted here. International exigencies and the reluctance of the majority of the Persian people to take a firm hand in administering their own affairs are important factors which must not be left out of reckoning in dealing with the whys and wherefores of foreign interference in the internal affairs of Persia.

Foreign troops stationed in any country, even if they be of a friendly and Allied power, are not particularly beneficial to the general welfare of the community. Anglo-Soviet-American troops have been stationed in Persia for over four years. The presence of these troops has directly and indirectly weakened the authority of the various governments, which have lasted only a few months. The days of a Cabinet minister or high civil servant in power have been numbered.

There is the case of an under-secretary with a long career in the Civil Service who time and again refused to join the Cabinet. He felt more secure in his less exalted position. He was eventually persuaded to accept the post of Minister of Finance. It lasted only a few months. Since then he has been out of a job and cannot even return to his former under-secretaryship. The insecurity of tenure of office, which is directly caused by political instability, which in turn is brought about by turbid external influences backed by foreign troops, is one of the main reasons why no reforms have been carried out since the recent advent of democracy in Persia. What Persia certainly does not need are undesirable elements and political adventurers to give her lessons in social reforms.

That there is need for reforms—administrative, economical and social—no one would deny, least of all the Persians; but to proscribe the Governments that have risen and fallen as well as the so-called "ruling classes" and the public services seems to be an unjust and nugatory ruling. It is the lack of stability caused by the presence of foreign troops in Persia that has brought about this confused situation. Remove the foreign troops from Persia and the intimidation that goes with them, and it will be found that Persia's memorable history, her great

heritages, and the resilience of her people will gradually but surely bring about the desired ameliorations. The sinister hand of foreign intervention, direct or indirect, with all its repercussions must be eradicated from Persia. Let Persians and Persians alone become the arbiters of their own country.

Contemporary history shows that for over twenty years before August 1941 when Persia had a stable government, no foreign power criticised her social conditions and suggested the hundred and one reforms that now seem to rend their tender political hearts. It brings to mind LaFontaine's famous fable:

"Once upon a time the plague made a visitation on the Earth, attacking all the animals in the jungle and killing many of them. King Lion called a council of all the beasts and said, 'Friends, it is clear that this agony has been sent as a punishment for some terrible crime committed on earth. Let us all therefore with scrupulous honesty examine publicly our conscience to discover which of us is the guilty one, and that he may be sacrificed to appease the heavenly wrath. I will commence. I confess that I am greedy and have killed many an innocent sheep for my meals, and sometimes the shepherd too.'

"The Fox arose and protested that the King was of too delicate a nature and that far from having committed a sin in eating the Sheep it was an honour for the Sheep to be of such service to the King; as for the shepherd he deserved death anyhow for presuming himself of higher standing than animals. There was much applause after which the Tiger, Bear and other touchy beasts with claws made their confessions which it was deemed wisest not to criticise, and they too were exonerated by the assembly and cheered. At last it was the turn of the Ass. He told of how one day crossing a field by a nunnery seeing how rich and cool the grass was, he cropped a little of it, although he knew he should not do so.

"There was immediate uproar at the hearing of so foul a crime. A Monkey proved in legal language that it was entirely due to the criminal activities of the vile wretch that the Earth was scourged by the plague. The Ass was convicted and executed."

LaFontaine adds "At court the difference between right and wrong depends on whether you are weak or strong."

CHAPTER IX

PERSIA'S PROBLEMS

T O - D A Y , leaving aside the question of foreign politics, Persia is gradually recuperating from the sudden violent shock of the repeated changes and dislocations of the last four years and is responding slowly but surely to the stimulus of a democratic government, freedom of thought and the establishment of a system encouraging initiative and stamping out evasion of responsibility.

Many urgent problems of social and economic reform face the government and people of Persia. The first step is surely the establishment of a strong central government, a strong democratic government backed by the Majlis comprising of genuinely elected deputies of the people. By this means and with assurance, breadth of outlook and vision, the machinery of the government may be knitted together on modern lines, authority for the execution of the government's plan may be delegated to responsible men, and by constant and inspired supervision each cog in the whole administration may revolve with precision and efficiency.

Once this initial momentum has been gained, it must never be allowed to relax. Law and order and security must rank first in the Government's plan. Then come the all-important problems of food and cost of living. The machinery for establishing security and order all over the country, supplying food to everyone and lowering the cost of living must run in such a way as to gain public confidence and support. Once the corner has been turned and the application of the economic assistance promised by the Allies has materialised, Persian authorities can with deliberation and prudence pick their way among the many urgent and vital problems facing them and concentrate on the essential requirements of the country. The system of local government, general health, sanitation, education, agriculture, commerce, industry, finance, all these and other branches of the administration of the country need complete overhaul.

The history of Persia has a sequence and continuity expanding from remote antiquity to the present day. Few other countries have been so rigorously dependent on their surroundings and natural circumstances. Persia's natural conditions have formed the basic national characteristics which have stood the test of

time for about 2,500 years, in face of invasions, wars, religious and social upheavals, not to mention the political designs of the Great Powers in the last 130 years. Despite all, Persia has maintained her independence and individuality as sturdily as any nation in the world. This is surely the greatest heritage of the Persian people. It is this continuity linking generations and centuries that constitutes the irreplaceable and proud position of Persians.

Persia has been in the past, as to-day, the link between east and west. In the days of the Chaldeans, Phœnicians and Lydians, Persia's geographic situation formed the crossroads between three vital plateaux: (1) in the north-west the fertile regions of Asia Minor and Caucasia; (2) in the west the regions of the Tigris and Euphrates and (3) in the south-east the vast plains of Punjab. To-day the Persian tableland forms the stepping stone between east and west.

That which geography has brought together not even history can part is a true saying which applies to Persia's relations with Great Britain and the Soviet Union in its fullest significance. The essential interests of Persia *vis-à-vis* Great Britain and the Soviet Union are complementary and not necessarily antagonistic. This is true conversely of the interests of Great Britain and the U.S.S.R. *vis-à-vis* Persia.

Of Anglo-Persian relations it can be said with satisfaction that they have withstood the test of time and some adverse circumstances during the last 150 years. It is the geography of Persia which has made Anglo-Persian relations of the utmost importance to both countries. Some people like to conjecture that this kinship of interests has been created or promoted by political machinations or financial considerations on the part of the British, and the Persians are accused of opportunist friendship towards the British and playing them off against Russia. Both assumptions deny the hard facts and lessons of geography as well as history.

Anglo-Persian relations are based on solid foundations of community of interests and good will; the momentum of the existing amity, nurtured in co-operation and community of interests, must never be allowed to relax. It must be intensified.

Persia's future must inevitably be placed first and foremost in the national and historic interests and purposes of the country, and the sovereign rights of her people and not on sentimental prejudice or abstract ideological theories. From the point of view of each and every Persian, this cannot be stressed too strongly. It transcends all other political questions facing

Persia. It is no exaggeration to say that with it the heart and soul of every Persian, of whatever creed or shade of opinion, will go all the way; without it the bottom drops out of any *rapprochement* with the Persians.

The lessons of history for Persia are clear and precise. While she has played her important part in the Middle and Near-Eastern politics, yet her vital interests for the last two centuries have been comprised primarily on her relations with Great Britain and Russia. The conduct of these two powerful nations towards Persia and Persia's relations towards them have formulated the major part of her foreign policy which in turn directly and decisively affect her national welfare and development.

The passage of time since the events of August 1941 has not diminished the force of the lesson learned in the first World War. A dispassionate and non-ideological analysis, however, brings one to the conclusion that a rigid pro-British or an indiscriminate and fanatical pro-Soviet policy in Persia is in itself a betrayal of the common interests of every class, community or political organisation. The price of workable and durable understanding between Persia on the one hand and Great Britain and U.S.S.R. on the other must be a readiness on the part of these powers to adhere strictly to the policy of non-interference in the internal affairs of Persia and the respect for her sovereign rights, and for the political factions in Persia to sacrifice such of their claims as prove, when examined, to be inconsistent with the common good of the country.

Persians are born and bred individualists, but as a nation they are united. The younger generation, which is steadily coming to the forefront of the social and administrative life of the country, has instilled virile notions and introduced forceful ways of life. The old passion for metaphysical speculation is gradually giving way to modern conceptions and a progressive sense of realism. This is the paramount impulse of to-day, forming a basis for the fresh thinking of to-morrow.

It would be fatal to ignore the intense national fervour and virility which has been resurrected in the younger generation of Persia and the surging which this awakening entails. Just as for twenty-five centuries Persia has maintained her entity, just as she has weathered the ups and downs of centuries, so to-day she is tolerating with equanimity the consequence of the rift between the Great Powers and the intransigence of her Russian ally. Conscious of her place in the forefront of nations in the past, and proud of her notable contributions to mankind's civilisation, Persia to-day is resolved to resuscitate and maintain

the standards and traditions of her cultural and historic attainments. Fully conscious of the singular service she has rendered to the Allied cause in the second World War, Persia relies on the honour of the Allied Powers to respect in deeds in victory the explicit undertakings and solemn pledges which they eagerly sought and accepted in the dark days of the War.

CHAPTER X

BEFORE THE SECURITY COUNCIL

IN the last weeks of 1945 and early in January 1946 the Persian Government of M. Hakimi with M. Nadjm as Foreign Minister, were seeking ways and means of direct contact at the highest level with the Soviet Government in order to stop the further deterioration of Perso-Soviet relations. They were handicapped in their efforts as the Soviet Ambassador to Teheran had left the country some time before and the Soviet Government had overlooked the appointment of a *chargé d'affaires* to represent them. All the hopes of Persia were centred upon the Conference of Foreign Ministers in Moscow and it was felt that the intimate discussions between Mr. Bevin and Mr. Byrnes on one side, together with M. Molotov on the other side were bound to produce tangible results in redress of Persia's grievances. This was not to be.

After the Moscow Conference the world learned with disappointment that Mr. Bevin was not able to surmount difficulties raised by M. Molotov on the Persian issue and that it was left unsolved. Mr. Bevin's proposal of the despatch of a Commission of three to Persia to study the outstanding problems did not meet with much support in Persia, as the consensus of opinion in the National Assembly and Government were against it. Anyway, the Soviets would not agree to it.

In order to leave no stone unturned, M. Hakimi, the Persian Prime Minister, offered to go to Moscow with his Foreign Minister to conduct discussions with high Soviet authorities, to learn of Soviet intentions with regard to Persia and to try to find a solution for the strained relations, but his offer did not meet with any response from Moscow.

Therefore, the Persian Government found itself with no alternative but to appeal to the Security Council of the United Nations holding its first meeting in London. It was, therefore,

on instructions from Teheran that M. S. H. Taqizadeh, Head of the Persian Delegation, wrote to Mr. Gladwyn Jell, Acting Secretary-General of the United Nations, under date of 19th January, 1945, that "owing to interference of the Soviet Union . . . in the internal affairs of Iran, a situation has arisen which may lead to international friction," and in accordance with the terms of Article 35 (1) of the Charter, the Head of the Persian Delegation requested that the matter be brought to the attention of the Security Council so that the Council might investigate the situation and recommend appropriate terms of settlement.

The Head of the Persian Delegation in presenting his case to the Security Council, pointed out that (1) the Persian Government regretted to confront the organization at the commencement of its work with the situation in Persia and (2) that the Persian Government sincerely deplored that they found themselves in dispute with the Soviet Union, with whom they not only have had a long-standing friendship but who is also their Ally. He went on to give a brief *résumé* of the valuable services rendered by Persia to the Allied cause, adding that the Persian Government had sought a solution of the dispute by direct approach to the Soviet Government in order to reach a solution by negotiation, but the Soviet Government had either not replied to such approaches or found themselves unable to admit Persia's protests. He also referred to the offer of the Persian Prime Minister and Foreign Minister to proceed to Moscow to arrive at a settlement with the Soviet Government and the fact that this was ignored.

M. Taqizadeh observed that in the light of the refusal of the Soviet Government either to discuss these matters or to cease these disturbances in Iran's internal affairs, the only course for the Persian Government was to bring the dispute to the attention of the Security Council as a situation which might lead to international friction. He then described the many interferences by Soviet authorities in Persia's internal affairs and alluded to the incident at Sharifabad in November 1945, when Soviet military authorities prevented Persian reinforcements from proceeding to Azerbaijan to restore law and order there.

In his final summing up of Soviet interventions in the internal affairs of Persia, M. Taqizadeh pointed out that the Soviet Government's reply to Persia's protests at these interferences completely proved that its attitude was directly contrary to the Treaty of Alliance and the Teheran Declaration. He placed Persia's request on record, which was that Soviet authorities should cease from interfering in the internal affairs of Persia, that Persian forces and officials should not be prevented from

proceeding freely in and through their own territory in which Soviet troops are stationed, and that the Soviet Government give necessary instructions to effect a complete withdrawal of all troops and officials by 2nd March, 1946.

M. Taqizadeh concluded his plea to the Security Council by: saying "I would like to add that in presenting these facts, the Iranian Delegation is animated with a desire for the maintenance of good relations with the Soviet Union. I have attempted to deal courteously and objectively with the facts of this unfortunate situation, which it is the earnest hope of the Iranian Delegation will be clarified in the cause of lasting friendship between the Soviet Union and Iran through the recommendation of the Security Council."

M. Vyshinsky, head of the Soviet Delegation, in reply to the Persian case, did not consider that the Security Council was justified from the legal point of view in considering the Persian case. He elaborated what he considered the two main issues raised by the Head of the Persian Delegation—first, whether negotiations had taken place between the Persian and Soviet Governments or not; and secondly, the consideration of the results of such negotiations. He contended that negotiations had actually taken place and that the Persian Government had expressed its satisfaction with the results of the negotiations. Moreover, the results were such, he observed, that the Persian Government did not think it necessary to continue the negotiations.

He further elaborated the Soviet case by remarking that ". . . the Soviet Government could not fail to point out that there had been a recent increase in propaganda hostile to the Soviet Union in Iran, which was obviously tolerated by the government of Hakimi." Anti-Democratic and "pogrom" activity on the part of reactionary forces in Iran, hostile to the Soviet Union, supported, he said, by certain influential Iranian groups drawn from the ruling classes and the police authorities, created for Azerbaijan and for Baku a danger of organised hostile actions, diversions and so forth. Such a situation could not be tolerated. However, the Soviet Government thought that such questions which affected the relations between the two neighbouring states—the U.S.S.R. and Iran—could and should be settled by means of bi-lateral negotiations between the Soviet Government and the Iranian Government. The Soviet Government did not and would not refuse to accept this method of settling such disputes arising between neighbours.

In reply to the Soviet delegate's statements, M. Taqizadeh

made a further pronouncement to the Security Council contesting his two main points—first, that there had been negotiations between Iran and the Soviet Union and that it was concluded or ended with an expression of satisfaction from Iran at the results obtained; and, secondly, that since there had been negotiation between the two parties, the latter could not be brought to the Council in accordance with the procedure provided in the Charter.

M. Vyshinsky had based his arguments on the Soviet interpretation of a note from the Persian Government expressing satisfaction on Soviet assurances that henceforth incidents of the nature complained of by the Persian Government would not occur again.

M. Taqizadeh appealed to the common sense of the members of the Security Council. "Is it at all possible or conceivable," he asked, "that a foreign Power would write to another country, which complains that all they have said is untrue, and say that the request to allow the Security forces to proceed is rejected, and that the aggrieved country should turn round and say 'Thank you'?"

M. Taqizadeh went on to amplify the fact that the Persian Government had sought negotiations and mentioned the offer of the Persian Prime Minister and Foreign Minister to go to Moscow to negotiate, but that it was ignored by Moscow. Ending his remarks, he said: "I would like to say that, now that this dispute has come before the Council and has found a place in its agenda, it cannot be dismissed and must not be dismissed. Under no circumstances must it go out of the hands of the Council; it must be pursued. If, as the Soviet delegate said at the conclusion of his statement, the Soviet Union are ready for direct negotiations, for the settlement of this dispute, we will be prepared to take part in direct negotiations, if the Council recommend this procedure to be taken. We have always tried in the past and have always wished to get in direct negotiation. But now this procedure should be adopted according to a recommendation of the Council and in accordance with the procedure laid down in the Charter. The Council should take this matter under its jurisdiction and negotiations should proceed under its ægis, and progress should be reported to the Council from time to time, results being reported to them within a reasonable lapse of time. In this way we are ready to get into direct negotiations with the Soviet Union; but, as I say, under no circumstances are we prepared to let the matter go out of the hands of the Council."

M. Vyshinsky, invited to reply, in turn contested M. Taqizadeh's statements that there were no direct negotiations between the Persian Government and the Soviet Government. He amplified his previous remarks that the negotiations were considered successful by the Persian Government, basing his contention on the aforesaid letter received by the Soviets from the Persian Foreign Minister.

M. Vyshinsky added that there was a question of national economy in Azerbaijan within the limits of the Iranian State, of desires and aspirations among the local population, desires in which there was nothing unusual in any democratic country. What had the Soviet troops to do with them?

The Iranian Government states that it wished to bring in additional troops, but that the Soviet Government had opposed this. This is true. In Northern Iran are stationed one infantry regiment, two infantry brigades and two regiments of gendarmerie, the most imposing police array. Are not these forces sufficient to restore order in this district? This was how the Soviet Government envisaged this question and its replies to the inquiries of the American and British Governments through Mr. Harriman and Sir Archibald Clark Kerr, the Soviet Government stated that these forces were amply sufficient provided, of course, that the local Iranian authorities themselves did not provoke the local population by their actions.

"The Iranian Delegation," he went on, "imposes the condition that the Security Council should not let this matter go out of its hands, that it should follow and control the course of the negotiations, and be informed of their result. If the position is that the Soviet Union, in its actions, must be placed under some supervision by the Security Council, I reject it as incompatible with the position of the Soviet Union among the other Powers of the world, as incompatible with its dignity as a member of the Security Council and as incompatible with the dignity of the United Nations organisation. I consider that if the Iranian Government is not in fact at the present time engaged here in fencing with the Soviet Union, but seeks a wise and healthy solution of this question, bilateral negotiations should be agreed upon, which, given goodwill on the part of the Soviet and Iranian Governments, may remove the existing misunderstandings between them. That good intentions on the part of the Soviet Government are there, I can guarantee, and I think that there is no reason why the Iranian Government should pursue a different attitude. There is no justification for talking about any conditions, especially as the Security

Council exists permanently as an active organ of the United Nations which has every possibility under the Charter, of exercising the rights granted to it by the Charter."

Mr. Bevin, the British Foreign Secretary, who spoke on behalf of the United Kingdom Delegation, suggested that a dispute between the Persian and Soviet Governments had arisen in pursuance of the carrying out of a Treaty to which the United



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Kingdom Government was a party as well as the two governments concerned. He referred to Article 4 of the Treaty wherein it is stipulated that "the presence of Allied forces on Iranian territory does not constitute a military occupation and will disturb as little as possible the administration and the security forces of Iran, the economic life of the country, the normal movements of the population and the application of Iranian laws and regulations."

"In that paragraph," stated Mr. Bevin, "the high contracting parties undertake to leave the sovereignty, the administration, the movement of security forces, the police, and everything, to the sole judgment of the Iranian Government. I was a little perturbed when I heard M. Vyshinsky say that it was the Soviet Government that decided the number of police and soldiers in Azerbaijan was sufficient to keep order, because under this Treaty the sole judge of that, in our view, as a party to the Treaty, was the Iranian Government and no one else. The Treaty also said that we would withdraw our forces six months after the end of hostilities, which is 2nd March. No other Treaty, no other Powers, nothing else, was taken into account in arriving at this Treaty.

"Therefore the question arises, has the sovereignty of the Iranian Government been infringed? According to the Iranian Government as I read the documents, having this internal difficulty arising in Azerbaijan—a similar difficulty historically to that which happened under the government of Russia in the early part of 1914—they proceeded, within their rights as a sovereign nation responsible for internal order, to take such steps as they deemed necessary to protect their nationals and protect order. Now, on the admission of M. Vyshinsky by the authority of the High Command of Soviet Russia, they were stopped. What is there to negotiate about? Were they in fact stopped? If they were, then there was an infringement of this Treaty, and I do not think there is any answer to that. The Treaty is perfectly clear. And what is to be result of such negotiations? What is there to decide?

"Personally, I have no objections to discussions between the Soviet Government and the Iranian Government, but I must say to the Council that we, too, are parties to the Treaty. What is going to be decided under this Treaty? I understand that is the only thing under discussion, although in the statement of the Soviet Union they refer to the danger in the Baku oilfields. I cannot imagine the Iranian Army or anybody else endangering the Baku oilfields. I really cannot. I think that is rather an exaggeration. Nor can I really imagine them being unable to maintain sufficient protection against saboteurs or anything referred to in the Soviet statement. . . . This thing did look to us in this country like a war of nerves. It did really look like the prescription laid down in, and quoted by the Iranian Government from M. Litvinoff's definition of what constituted aggression. I am quite certain if this can be eliminated it will be for the benefit of the world."

Mr. Bevin then pleaded with M. Vyshinsky to agree to leave the matter on the agenda. He suggested, "We do represent power and power does count in negotiations. There are armies in Iran. They are there by the kindness of Iran, to whom I am sure every ally, having regard to the victory we have won and the transportation that it represented to us in our very darkest moments, must feel a sense of gratitude. Yet the small power has to negotiate with an army of I cannot tell how many thousands on her territory at this moment.

"We stand for the integrity of Iran, without interference in her sovereignty, for the removal of troops from her territory as quickly as we can, and the last man to go by the date we have agreed; for leaving her and her people to work out their political and economic salvation in their own way; and for us, as great Powers, not to sit in judgment on them as regards their internal affairs."

Finally, the Security Council discussed in detail their decision. M. Vyshinsky opposed the suggestion that the question should remain on the agenda of the Security Council and insinuated that this arose out of exceptional suspicion.

Mr. Bevin assured him that it was not a question of distrust or anything of the kind. He pointed out that the Iranian Delegation had referred the problem to the Security Council under Article 35 of the Charter and that the Council was referring it back for bi-lateral negotiation. Therefore it seemed to Mr. Bevin that the Council, by that act, had not discharged its duty. He insisted that until the report on that bi-lateral negotiation was sent to the Council with the results achieved, it still remained before the Council under the Charter.

M. Taquizadeh intervened here and stated that the Iranian Delegation had agreed to negotiate provided that the matter in dispute remained before the Council. He did not think that that was a formality and even if it was a formality, if taken off the agenda experience had been gained that it was to the detriment of the small country. The world would take it that the small nation's appeal was dismissed.

Mr. Bevin then asked M. Vyshinsky would he agree that if the progress of the negotiations was not satisfactory, the matter could be discussed by the Security Council.

M. Vyshinsky expressed the opinion that the question was largely hypothetical because he did not conceive that this comparatively simple matter could not be settled by bi-lateral negotiations between U.S.S.R. and Iran. But if, unexpectedly, owing to other circumstances or to the interference by some

hotheads, results were lacking, then, M. Vyshinsky affirmed, "I can thus answer Mr. Bevin's question, yes, in accordance with the terms of the Charter."

The Security Council on 30th January, 1946, adopted unanimously the following resolution on the question:

"The Council having heard the statements by the representatives of the Soviet Union and Iran in the course of its meetings of 28th and 30th January, and having taken cognisance of the documents presented by the Soviet and Iranian Delegations and those referred to in the course of the oral debates; considering that both parties have affirmed their readiness to seek a solution of the matter at issue by negotiation; and such negotiations will be resumed in the near future, requests the parties to inform the Council of any results achieved in such negotiations. The Council in the meanwhile retains the right at any time to request information on the progress of the negotiations."

After preliminary discussions in London between M. Taquizadeh and M. Vyshinsky, negotiations were started between M. Shurad Qavam, the Persian Prime Minister, who travelled to Moscow with the Persian Delegation, and Marshal Stalin and M. Molotov. The negotiations lasted about a fortnight and were conducted at the highest level with the Soviet Government, but unfortunately no results were obtained.

On return to Teheran the Persian Prime Minister confirmed that the negotiations in Moscow had failed and that he had not achieved the object that he had in view.

See Appendix IV.

CHAPTER XI

WITHDRAWAL OF ALLIED TROOPS

CONDITIONS governing the withdrawal of Allied troops from Persia are explicitly laid down in Article 5 of the 1942 Treaty of Alliance, which stipulates that:

The forces of the Allied Powers shall be withdrawn from Iranian territory not later than six months after all hostilities between the Allied Powers and Germany and her associates have been suspended by the conclusion of an armistice or armistices, or on the conclusion of peace between them, whichever date is the earlier. The expression "associates"

of Germany means all other Powers which have engaged or may in the future engage in hostilities against either of the Allied Powers.

There can be no ambiguity about it. Anglo-Soviet troops entered Persia in August 1941 to secure lines of communications and to expedite the despatch of war supplies to Soviet fronts and as Mr. Ernest Bevin, the Foreign Secretary, stated in the House of Commons on 20th August, 1945, "When . . . that purpose has been accomplished, both countries should withdraw."

Subsequently U.S. troops came to Persia and helped with the transport problems in the Persian Gulf regions. The Persians were assured of the temporary character of the stay of U.S. troops and their withdrawal after the war.

After the defeat of Germany on 8th May, 1945, the Persian Government felt that while the Treaty decided withdrawal six months after cessation of hostilities with Germany and her associates, and that the Allies had still to defeat Japan, yet the stay of Allied troops in Persia had lost its *raison d'être*, particularly as Russia was not at war with Japan. Hence the Persian Government requested Great Britain, the Soviet Union and the United States of America to arrange for the early withdrawal of their troops from Persia.

It was felt that the time limit provided in the Treaty was the maximum and that in view of Allied victory over Germany and Persia's valuable services to the common cause, the period of Allied stay could be reduced to the minimum. This was not merely the expression of the natural desire of the Persian people but it was an essential pre-requisite to the re-establishment of the authority of the Persian Government so necessary for the carrying out of urgent reforms and the return to normal conditions.

The United States Government through their Minister in Teheran informed the Persian Government on 16th June, 1945, that their Government viewed the request with sympathy and that arrangements for the rapid reduction of American troops there had already been made. Moreover, the task of the Persian Gulf Command having been completed on 1st June, 1945, withdrawal of American forces from Persia had been in progress for some months and would continue as rapidly as the exigencies of the military situation permit.

The British situation was not so simple, because as co-signatories to the Treaty of Alliance, they had to contend

with the Russians. The Diplomatic Correspondent of the *Times* on 31st May, 1945, summed up the British attitude by observing:

The British Government are only too anxious for the removal of all Allied troops from Persian territory. So far as can be gathered, the Soviet Government regards the existing treaty as providing for the withdrawal of troops not later than six months after the end of the war. According to the British interpretation, this means the war with Germany. The Soviet Government seems to take the view that it refers to the war against Japan, to which of course, Russia is not a party.

At the last meeting of the Potsdam Conference of Allied leaders in July 1945 Persia's request was brought up for consideration by the British Government. As few Americans remained in Persia, it was mainly an Anglo-Soviet decision. The decision reached amounted to the withdrawal of Anglo-Soviet troops from Teheran, the capital.

On 20th August, 1945, Mr. Ernest Bevin, making his first survey of foreign affairs, as Foreign Secretary, in the House of Commons, said it was the view of H.M. Government that since Persia allowed Great Britain and Russia to utilise her territory for the purpose of defeating the enemy, when that purpose had been accomplished both countries should withdraw.

"Not only the Soviet Government and ourselves had these facilities from the Persian Government, but the United States forces had also been able to use them," he said, "and they were of tremendous value in providing a vital link with Russia during the most critical days of the war. It was not our policy to take advantage of the facilities given under the agreement for any purpose other than that for which they were given, namely, the prosecution of the war."

Neither did he believe that it was the policy of our Allies. He would be very much surprised, he said, if, having been freely accorded these valuable facilities, any country would demur to withdraw when that purpose was served.

After the defeat of Japan, and the signing of the Instrument of Surrender on 2nd September, 1945, there were no possible grounds on which Anglo-Soviet forces could prolong their stay beyond the time limit stipulated in the Treaty. The Persian Government therefore approached the three Allied Powers to learn their decision regarding the details of withdrawal from Persia. They agreed that the maximum date by which,

according to the Treaty, the Allies would have to withdraw from Persia would be 2nd March, 1946.

The Council of Foreign Ministers in London, in the closing stages of their meeting in September 1945 discussed the question and Mr. Ernest Bevin gave a report of their decision to the House of Commons on 10th October, 1945. He explained that on behalf of the British Government he had suggested to the Soviet Government that since Anglo-Soviet forces had completed the war-time tasks for which they were sent to Persia they might well satisfy the Persian Government's natural desire to see as much of its territory as possible freed from the presence of foreign troops and that instead of waiting until 2nd March, 1946, Great Britain and the Soviet Union should agree that by the middle of December 1945 their respective forces should be withdrawn from the whole of Persia, with the exception of the British remaining in the southern oil area and the Soviet forces in Azerbaijan until 2nd March, 1946.

To this, M. Molotov had expressed the disagreement of the Soviet Government, adding that the question of withdrawal of Anglo-Soviet troops from Persia should be effected within the period laid down in the Treaty and in a written communication he reassured Mr. Bevin that, *"the Soviet Government attached exceptional importance to the strict fulfilment of obligations undertaken."*¹

The United States Ambassador in Moscow, acting under instructions from his Government, delivered a Note to the Soviet Government on 24th November, 1945, concerning the disturbed situation in Persia. It pointed out to the Soviet Government that as long as any foreign troops remained in Persia, incidents and misunderstandings were likely to occur. The American Note further stated that the U.S.A. had already reduced its forces in Persia during 1945 from a maximum strength of 28,000 to less than 6,000 and that there were no American combat troops in Persia. These forces had been ordered to complete withdrawal from Persia by 1st January, 1946. The American Government proposed that the British and Soviet Governments should issue similar instructions to their commanders and that arrangements be made immediately for the complete withdrawal of all foreign troops from Persia by 1st January, 1946. The Note ended:

Nations such as Iran were encouraged at the United Nations Conference at San Francisco to place full trust in the friendly intentions and good will of the permanent

¹ See Appendix VI.

members of the Security Council. The Government of the United States is confident that the Soviet Union and Great Britain are no less anxious than the U.S., in dealing with such nations as Iran, to follow a line of action which will make it clear that the trust of these nations in the permanent members of the Security Council has not been misplaced.

The Soviet Government in reply informed the U.S. Embassy in Moscow on 29th November, 1945, that the question of withdrawal of Soviet troops from Persia was the subject of consideration at the Council of Foreign Ministers in London and was decided; therefore, the U.S.S.R. Government did not see grounds for renewed consideration of the time limit for the renewal of their forces from Persia.

CHAPTER XII

THE VIOLATED PLEDGE

So we come to 2ND MARCH, 1946, the day on which the Soviet Government, in accordance with the maximum period stipulated in the Treaty Alliance with Persia and the United Kingdom, and in accordance with the solemn pledges they had undertaken in the Treaty and confirmed by them time after time, all Russian armed forces should have withdrawn from Persia.

On 2nd March, 1946, all British armed forces withdrew from Persian territory; but the Persian people were stunned to discover that the Soviet Government, disregarding all their pledges, had flagrantly violated the terms of the Treaty and refused to withdraw their armed forces from Persian soil.

On 1st March, 1946, Moscow Radio made the following bland announcement: "On 25th February, during discussions with the Persian Prime Minister, Qavam-es-Saltaneh, he was informed of the decision of the Soviet Government that, with effect from 2nd March, Soviet troops would begin their evacuation of the areas of Meshed, Shahrud and Semnan, in eastern Persia. The Soviet troops in other areas of Persia will remain there pending clarification of the situation."

This was all that Moscow had to say on the flagrant violation of an international agreement and a Treaty of Alliance with two Allies—Persia and Great Britain.

The Persian Prime Minister lodged a strong protest both

verbally and in a written communication to M. Stalin and M. Molotov on the decision to retain Soviet troops in Persia. Obviously no agreements of any nature could be reached with the Soviet Government until such time as Russian troops cleared out of the country. On his return to Teheran he stated that the Soviet Government had not been able to accept his firm and pressing demand for the evacuation of Persia.

The Diplomatic Correspondent of the *Sunday Times* of 3rd March, writing under the heading "Serious View of Persia Crisis," observed:

"The most serious crisis since the war' is how the Russian decision to maintain Soviet troops in Persia is regarded in diplomatic quarters in London. Under the Tripartite Treaty of 1942 the Great Powers had agreed to withdraw all their forces by yesterday. I understand that the situation is now the subject of an exchange of views between the British and American Governments. It is probable that Moscow will be asked for explanations.

"Russia's action is regarded as the first open and flagrant violation of an international treaty since the war. Previous differences with the Soviet Government, such as controversy over the Yalta agreement on the subject of Poland and over the Berlin agreement regarding peace treaties were based on questions of interpretation. In the case of Persia, the provisions of the Tripartite Treaty and M. Molotov's declaration to Mr. Bevin last September, and to the American Government in December, are specific and categorical. There is no dispute as to interpretation. Russia has acted unilaterally and without previous consultation with either Britain or America. No explanation has been given and no attempt has been made to justify her action."

On 3rd March, at a special session of the National Assembly, Dr. Mohammad Mossadegh, leading Deputy of Teheran, protested vehemently on behalf of the Persian nation against the continued presence of Soviet troops on Persian soil as "a Soviet violation of the Tripartite Treaty." He said "Even now, six months after the end of hostilities, unfortunately against our expectations, our soil has not been freed from foreign troops, and they are bringing about circumstances that threaten our very existence, our territorial integrity and all our future. This portends ill for us."

In another passage Dr. Mossadegh remarked "We consider the question of evacuation from Persian territory as an accomplished fact, as it has already been decided by the terms of the

Tripartite Treaty. Our destinies are continuously being dragged from one conference to another. Potsdam, London and then Moscow—and we know not where it will lead us next.”

Dr. Mossadegh's statement was interrupted several times by the cheers and acclamations of all the 96 Deputies present.

Soon after the announcement on the Moscow Radio, the British Government, through the British Chargé d'Affaires in Moscow, took up the matter with the Soviet Government. The British Note reminded the Soviet Government of their unqualified and reiterated obligations under the Tripartite Treaty, under which all foreign troops were to be withdrawn from Persia, “*six months after the end of hostilities*,” and pointed out that British armed forces had left Persian territory by 2nd March, the agreed date, and asked what were the Soviet intentions.

The States Department in Washington also took up the matter without delay and in an official Note to the Soviet Government, dated 6th March, the American Chargé d'Affaires in Moscow declared that the United States “cannot remain indifferent” to the Soviet decision to keep their armed forces in Persia beyond the period agreed upon in the Treaty of Alliance.

The Note declared: “The Government of the United States, in the spirit of friendly association which developed between the United States and the Soviet Union in their successful effort against the common enemy and as a fellow-member of the United Nations, expresses the earnest hope that the Government of the Soviet Union will do its part, by withdrawing immediately all Soviet forces from the territory of Iran, to promote the international confidence which is necessary among the peoples of all nations. The Government of the United States trusts that the Government of the Soviet Union no less than itself appreciates the heavy responsibility resting upon Great Powers under the Charter to observe their obligations and request the sovereign rights of other States.”

The Note requested that the United States be “promptly advised” of a Soviet decision, and expressed the hope that this decision would be in accord with the United States view as set forth in the Note.

The Note recalled the statement by the Soviet Government on 29th November, 1945, in reply to the United States suggestion that all foreign troops leave Persia, to the effect that the period of stationing Soviet armed forces in Persia was governed by the Treaty of Alliance of 1942. The United States Government was not aware of any questioning of this commitment at the

"The decision of the Soviet Government to retain Soviet troops in Iran beyond the period stipulated by the Tripartite Treaty has created a situation with regard to which the Government of the United States, as a member of the United Nations and as a party to the declaration regarding Iran, dated 1st December, 1943, cannot remain indifferent," the Note stated.

It recalled that the Security Council generally accepted that the keeping of the troops of one member of the United Nations in the territory of another member without the consent of the latter was not in accordance with the principles of the United Nations, and the withdrawal of such troops should not be contingent upon other issues.

Both these diplomatic representations are still unanswered by the Soviet Government, though they have been pressed by the British and American Chargé d'Affaires in Moscow to give a reply.

On 14th March, Mr. Bevin made the following statement in the House of Commons:

"As the House is aware, His Majesty's Government have addressed to the Soviet Government an inquiry as to their intentions in respect of the withdrawal of their troops from Persia. I have received inquiries whether it is the intention of His Majesty's Government to replace British troops in Persia. No decision to the effect has been taken by His Majesty's Government, nor have they taken any steps to open negotiations with the Persian Government for the return of British troops. I ought to say that we received the most categorical assurances from Generalissimo Stalin and the Soviet Government that the integrity of Persia would be respected, and that there was no intention of taking aggressive action against her. The Soviet Foreign Ministry, in their reply to the representations which we made in November last on the subject of the reported Soviet interference in the internal affairs of Persia, stated that: 'In so far as reference is made in your letter to the Tripartite Treaty of 1942, and the declaration of the Three Powers on Iran, I have to state that, in accordance with this Treaty and Declaration, the Soviet Government invariably carries out a policy of respect for the territorial integrity, suzerainty, and independence of Iran.'

"Moreover, at the time of the London meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers, when the question of the withdrawal of British and Soviet troops from Persia was discussed, I clearly understood from M. Molotov that there was no difference of view as to the date by which Allied troops should be withdrawn

under the treaty, that is to say, by 2nd March, 1946, six months after the signing of the Japanese instrument of surrender. In his letter which concluded the correspondence on this subject, which I communicated to the House, M. Molotov asked me to bear in mind the exceptional importance which the Soviet Government attached to the strict fulfilment of their obligations.

"It is difficult for His Majesty's Government to understand the present policy of Soviet Russia in this matter, and more difficult for us to believe that all these assurances are not going to be fulfilled. We are now awaiting the reply of the Soviet Government to the inquiries which we have addressed to them. When His Majesty's Government became a party to the resolution of the Security Council on 30th January, that direct negotiations should be undertaken between the Soviet and Persian Governments, they did so on the clear assumption that the existing treaty obligation to withdraw Allied troops from Persia on 2nd March would be fulfilled, and His Majesty's Government would regret any settlement which appeared to be extracted from the Persian Government under duress, while the Soviet Army was still in occupation of part of Persia."

Mr. Churchill, speaking at a dinner on 15th March, given in his honour by the City of New York, referred to the Persian case and remarked:

"The British Government of which I was the head signed a treaty with Russia and with Persia solemnly undertaking to respect the integrity and sovereignty of Persia and to evacuate that country by a certain date. This treaty was reaffirmed in Teheran by the Tripartite Agreement signed by the head of the Soviet Government, by the late President Roosevelt and by me. In fulfilment of this agreement the United States and the British have already left that country. But now we are told that the Soviet Government, instead of leaving, are actually sending in more troops.

"Now this is one of those cases for which the United Nations Security Council was especially devised, and I am very glad to read in the newspaper that Soviet representatives will attend the meeting of the Council which is to take place in New York. By all means let the matter be thrashed out there, and let respect be shown even by the greatest or most deeply interested Powers to the conclusions of the Security Council. In this way the reign of world law and the international foundation of enduring peace would be immeasurably consolidated."

In Teheran the Mejlis having reached the end of its appointed term has been dissolved. No fresh elections can be held until

such time as all foreign troops have been withdrawn from Persian territory. The caretaker Government of M. Ahmad Qavam now bears all the responsibility in steering his country's political destiny during these momentous and difficult days.

In the meantime the Soviet press and radio have kept up a tirade of abuse and agitation against the "aggressive tendencies" of Persia, which according to Moscow threaten Soviet Azerbaijan and the oil regions of Baku. Persian "ruling classes" are accused of fantastic aspirations against Soviet territory, and of trying to secure their territorial claims by making the Soviet Union clash with some other great Power. The Persian Government is being accused of "defending the monopolistic possession of British oil concessions in south Persia."

The clatter and cacophony of this kind of diatribe has grown more and more intensified as the Soviet Government have found Persia more and more adamant on the fundamental question of the presence of Russian troops in their country.

And all this because Persia as an ally of the Soviet Union demands her just and due rights—i.e. the fulfilment in the letter and in the spirit of Soviet obligations—and no more.

APPENDIX I

TREATY OF ALLIANCE BETWEEN THE UNITED KINGDOM AND THE SOVIET UNION AND IRAN (WITH NOTES)

Teheran, 29th January, 1942

HIS Majesty The King of Great Britain, Ireland and the British Dominions beyond the Seas, Emperor of India, and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, on the one hand, and His Imperial Majesty The Shahinshah of Iran, on the other;

Having in view the principles of the Atlantic Charter⁽¹⁾ jointly agreed upon and announced to the world by the President of the United States of America and the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom on the 14th August, 1941, and endorsed by the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the 24th September, 1941, with which His Imperial Majesty The Shahinshah declares his complete agreement and from which he wishes to benefit on an equal basis with other nations of the world; and

Being anxious to strengthen the bonds of friendship and mutual understanding between them; and

Considering that these objects will best be achieved by the conclusion of a Treaty of Alliance;

Have agreed to conclude a treaty for this purpose and have appointed as their plenipotentiaries;

His Majesty The King of Great Britain, Ireland and the British Dominions beyond the Seas, Emperor of India,

For the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland,

His Excellency Sir Reader William Bullard, K.C.M.G., C.I.E.,

His Majesty's Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary in Iran.

The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics,

His Excellency M. Andre Andreewich Smirnov, Ambassador Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in Iran.

His Imperial Majesty The Shahinshah of Iran,

His Excellency M. Ali Soheily, Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Who, having communicated their full powers, found in good and due form, have agreed as follows:

ARTICLE 1

His Majesty The King of Great Britain, Ireland and the British Dominions beyond the Seas, Emperor of India, and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (hereinafter referred to as the Allied Powers) jointly and severally undertake to respect the territorial integrity, sovereignty and political independence of Iran.

⁽¹⁾ Cmd. 6321.

ARTICLE 2

An alliance is established between the Allied Powers on the one hand and His Imperial Majesty The Shahinshah of Iran on the other.

ARTICLE 3

(i) The Allied Powers jointly and severally undertake to defend Iran by all means at their command from all aggression on the part of Germany or any other Power.

(ii) His Imperial Majesty The Shahinshah undertakes—

- (a) to co-operate with the Allied Powers with all the means at his command and in every way possible, in order that they may be able to fulfil the above undertaking. The assistance of the Iranian forces shall, however, be limited to the maintenance of internal security on Iranian territory;
- (b) to secure to the Allied Powers, for the passage of troops or supplies from one Allied Power to the other or for other similar purposes, the unrestricted right to use, maintain, guard and, in case of military necessity, control in any way that they may require all means of communication throughout Iran, including railways, roads, rivers, aerodromes, ports, pipelines and telephone, telegraph and wireless installations;
- (c) to furnish all possible assistance and facilities in obtaining material and recruiting labour for the purpose of the maintenance and improvement of the means of communication referred to in paragraph (b);
- (d) to establish and maintain, in collaboration with the Allied Powers, such measures of censorship control as they may require for all the means of communication referred to in paragraph (b).

(iii) It is clearly understood that in the application of paragraph (ii) (b), (c) and (d) of the present article the Allied Powers will give full consideration to the essential needs of Iran.

ARTICLE 4

(i) The Allied Powers may maintain in Iranian territory land, sea and air forces in such number as they consider necessary. The location of such forces shall be decided in agreement with the Iranian Government so long as the strategic situation allows. All questions concerning the relations between the forces of the Allied Powers and the Iranian authorities shall be settled so far as possible in co-operation with the Iranian authorities in such a way as to safeguard the security of the said forces. It is understood that the presence of these forces on Iranian territory does not constitute a military occupation and will disturb as little as possible the adminis-

tration and the security forces of Iran, the economic life of the country, the normal movements of the population and the application of Iranian laws and regulations.

(ii) A separate agreement or agreements shall be concluded as soon as possible after the entry into force of the present Treaty regarding any financial obligations to be borne by the Allied Powers under the provisions of the present article and of paragraphs (ii) (b), (c) and (d) of Article 3 above in such matters as local purchases, the hiring of buildings and plant, the employment of labour, transport charges, etc. A special agreement shall be concluded between the Allied Governments and the Iranian Government defining the conditions for any transfers to the Iranian Government after the war of buildings and other improvements effected by the Allied Powers on Iranian territory. These agreements shall also settle the immunities to be enjoyed by the forces of the Allied Powers in Iran.

ARTICLE 5

The forces of the Allied Powers shall be withdrawn from Iranian territory not later than six months after all hostilities between the Allied Powers and Germany and her associates have been suspended by the conclusion of an armistice or armistices, or on the conclusion of peace between them, whichever date is the earlier. The expression "associates" of Germany means all other Powers which have engaged or may in the future engage in hostilities against either of the Allied Powers.

ARTICLE 6

(i) The Allied Powers undertake in their relations with foreign countries not to adopt an attitude which is prejudicial to the territorial integrity, sovereignty or political independence of Iran, nor to conclude treaties inconsistent with the provisions of the present Treaty. They undertake to consult the Government of His Imperial Majesty the Shahinshah in all matters affecting the direct interests of Iran.

(ii) His Imperial Majesty The Shahinshah undertakes not to adopt in his relations with foreign countries an attitude which is inconsistent with the alliance, nor to conclude treaties inconsistent with the provisions of the present Treaty.

ARTICLE 7

The Allied Powers jointly undertake to use their best endeavours to safeguard the economic existence of the Iranian people against the privations and difficulties arising as a result of the present war. On the entry into force of the present Treaty, discussions shall be

opened between the Government of Iran and the Governments of the Allied Powers as to the best possible methods of carrying out the above undertaking.

ARTICLE 8

The provisions of the present Treaty are equally binding as bilateral obligations between His Imperial Majesty The Shahinshah and each of the two other High Contracting Parties.

ARTICLE 9

The present Treaty shall come into force on signature and shall remain in force until the date fixed for the withdrawal of the forces of the Allied Powers from Iranian territory in accordance with Article 5.

In witness whereof, the above-named plenipotentiaries have signed the present Treaty and have affixed thereto their seals.

Done at Teheran in triplicate in English, Russian and Persian, all being equally authentic, on the 29th day of January, 1942.

(L.S.) R. W. BULLARD.

(L.S.) A. A. SMIRNOV.

(L.S.) ALI SOHEILI.

ANNEX 1

*Identic Notes addressed to the Iranian Minister for Foreign Affairs
by His Majesty's Minister and the Soviet Ambassador*

With reference to Article 6, paragraph (i), of the Treaty of Alliance signed to-day, I have the honour, on behalf of His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom/the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, to assure Your Excellency that my Government interpret the provisions of this clause as being applicable to any peace conference or conferences held at the conclusion of the present war, or other general international conferences. Consequently they consider themselves bound not to approve anything at any such conference which is prejudicial to the territorial integrity, sovereignty or political independence of Iran, and not to discuss at any such conference anything affecting the direct interests of Iran without consultation with the Government of Iran.

His Majesty's Government/the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics will further do their best to secure that Iran will be represented on a footing of equality in any peace negotiations directly affecting her interests.

ANNEX 2

Identic Notes addressed to His Majesty's Minister and the Soviet Ambassador by the Iranian Minister for Foreign Affairs

With reference to Article 6, paragraph (ii), of the Treaty of Alliance signed this day, I have the honour, on behalf of the Iranian Government, to assure Your Excellency that the Iranian Government would consider it contrary to their obligations under this clause to maintain diplomatic relations with any State which is in diplomatic relations with neither of the Allied Powers.

ANNEX 3

Identic Notes addressed to the Iranian Minister for Foreign Affairs by His Majesty's Minister and the Soviet Ambassador

I have the honour, on behalf of His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom/the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, to convey to Your Excellency the following assurances:

- (1) With reference to Article 3 (ii) (a) of the Treaty of Alliance which has been signed to-day, the Allied Powers will not require of Iran the participation of her armed forces in any war or military operations against any Foreign Power or Powers.
 - (2) With reference to Article 4 (ii), it is understood that there is no provision in the Treaty which requires that the Iranian Government shall bear the cost of any works which the Allied Powers carry out for their own military ends and which are not necessary for the needs of Iran.
 - (3) It is understood that Annex 1 will remain in force even if the Treaty ceases to be valid, in accordance with the provisions of Article 9, before peace has been concluded.
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APPENDIX II

No. 268

**TREATY OF FRIENDSHIP BETWEEN PERSIA AND THE RUSSIAN SOCIALIST
FEDERAL SOVIET REPUBLIC, SIGNED AT MOSCOW, 26TH FEBRUARY, 1921**

The Persian Government of the one part, and the Russian Socialist Federal Soviet Republic of the other part, desiring to establish relations of friendship and fraternity between the two nations, have decided to engage in negotiations for this purpose, and have therefore appointed the following plenipotentiaries:

For Persia: Ali Choli Khan Mochaverol-Memalek, and for
Russia: G. V. Tchitcherin and L. M. Karakhan.

who after the verification of their respective powers, have agreed as follows:

ARTICLE 1

In order to confirm its declarations regarding Russian policy towards the Persian nation, which formed the subject of correspondence on 14th January, 1918, and 26th June, 1919, the R.S.F.S.R. formally affirms once again that it definitely renounces the tyrannical policy carried out by the Colonizing Governments of Russia which have been overthrown by the will of the workers and peasants of Russia.

Inspired by this principle, and desiring that the Persian people should be happy and independent and should be able to dispose freely of its patrimony, the Russian Republic declares the whole body of treaties and conventions concluded with Persia by the Tsarist Government, which crushed the rights of the Persian people, to be null and void.

ARTICLE 2

The R.S.F.S.R. expresses its reprobation of the policy of the Tsarist Governments of Russia, which, on the pretext of ensuring the independence of the peoples of Asia, concluded, without the consent of the latter, treaties with European Powers, the sole object of which was to subjugate those peoples.

This criminal policy, which infringed upon the independence of the countries of Asia and which made the living nations of the

East a prey to the cupidity and the tyranny of European robbers, is abandoned unconditionally by Federal Russia.

Federal Russia, therefore, in accordance with the principles laid down in Articles 1 and 4 of this Treaty, declares its refusal to participate in any action which might destroy or weaken Persian sovereignty. It regards as null and void the whole body of treaties and conventions concluded by the former Russian Government with third parties in respect of Persia or to the detriment of that country.

ARTICLE 3

The two Contracting Powers agree to accept and respect the Russo-Persian frontiers, as drawn by the Frontier Commission in 1881.

At the same time, in view of the repugnance which the Russian Federal Government feels to enjoying the fruit of the policy of usurpation of the Tsarist Government, it renounces all claim to the Achouredh Islands and to the other islands on the Astrabad Littoral, and restores to Persia the village of Firoureh and the adjacent land ceded to Russia in virtue of the Convention of 28th May, 1893.

The Persian Government agrees for its part that the Russian Sarakhs, or "old" Sarakhs, and the land adjacent to the Sarakhs River, shall be retained by Russia.

The two High Contracting Parties shall have equal rights of usage over the Atrak River and the other frontier rivers and waterways. In order finally to solve the question of the waterways and all disputes concerning frontiers or territories, a Commission, composed of Russian and Persian representatives, shall be appointed.

ARTICLE 4

In consideration of the fact that each nation has the right to determine freely its political destiny, each of the two Contracting Parties formally expresses its desire to abstain from any intervention in the internal affairs of the other.

ARTICLE 5

The two High Contracting Parties undertake:

(1) To prohibit the formation or presence within their respective territories, of any organization or groups of persons, irrespective of the name by which they are known, whose object is to engage in acts of hostility against Persia or Russia, or against the Allies of Russia.

They will likewise prohibit the formation of troops or

armies within their respective territories with the aforementioned object.

(2) Not to allow a third party or organization, whatever it be called, which is hostile to the other Contracting Party, to import or to convey in transit across their countries material which can be used against the other party.

(3) To prevent by all means in their power the presence within their territories or within the territories of their Allies of all armies or forces of a third party in cases in which the presence of such forces would be regarded as a menace to the frontiers, interests or safety of the other Contracting Party.

ARTICLE 6

If a third party should attempt to carry out a policy of usurpation by means of armed intervention in Persia, or if such Power should desire to use Persian territory as a base of operations against Russia, or if a Foreign Power should threaten the frontiers of Federal Russia or those of its Allies, and if the Persian Government should not be able to put a stop to such menace after having been once called upon to do so by Russia, Russia shall have the right to advance her troops into the Persian interior for the purpose of carrying out the military operations necessary for its defence. Russia undertakes, however, to withdraw her troops from Persian territory as soon as the danger has been removed.

ARTICLE 7

The considerations set forth in Article 6 have equal weight in the matter of the security of the Caspian Sea. The two High Contracting Parties, therefore, have agreed that Federal Russia shall have the right to require the Persian Government to send away foreign subjects, in the event of their taking advantage of their engagement in the Persian navy to undertake hostile action against Russia.

ARTICLE 8

Federal Russia finally renounces the economic policy pursued in the East by the Tsarist Government, which consisted in lending money to the Persian Government, not with a view to the economic development of the country, but rather for purposes of political subjugation.

Federal Russia accordingly renounces its rights in respect of the loans granted to Persia by the Tsarist Governments. It regards the

debts due to it as void, and will not require their repayment. Russia likewise renounces its claims to the resources of Persia which were specified as security for the loans in question.

ARTICLE 9

In view of the declaration by which it has repudiated the colonial and capitalist policy, which occasioned so many misfortunes and was the cause of so much bloodshed, Federal Russia abandons the continuation of the economic undertakings of the Tsarist Government, the object of which was the economic subjugation of Persia. Federal Russia therefore cedes to the Persian Government the full ownership of all funds and of all real and other property, which the Russian Discount Bank possesses on Persian territory, and likewise transfers to it all the assets and liabilities of that Bank. The Persian Government nevertheless agrees that in the towns where it has been decided that the Russian Socialist Republic may establish Consulates, and where buildings exist belonging to the Discount Bank, one of these buildings, to be chosen by the Russian Government, shall be placed at the disposal of the Russian Consulate, free of charge.

ARTICLE 10

The Russian Federal Government, having abandoned the colonial policy, which consisted in the construction of roads and telegraph lines more in order to obtain military influence in other countries than for the purpose of developing their civilizations, and being desirous of providing the Persian people with those means of communication indispensable for the independence and development of any nation, and also in order to compensate the Persian people as far as possible for the losses incurred by the sojourn in its territory of the Tsarist armies, cedes free of charge to the Persian Government the following Russian installations:

- (a) The high roads from Enzeli to Teheran, and from Kashan to Hamadan, and all land and installations in connection with these roads.
- (b) The rail-road Djoulfe-Tauris-Sefian Urmiah, with all installations, rolling-stock and accessories.
- (c) The landing-stages, warehouses, steamships, canals, and all means of transport of the lake of Urmiah.
- (d) All telegraph and telephone lines established in Persia by the Tsarist Governments, with all movable and immovable installations and dependencies.
- (e) The port of Enzeli and the warehouses, with the electrical installation, and other buildings.

ARTICLE 11

In view of the fact that the Treaty of Turkomentchai, concluded on 10th February, 1828 (old style) between Persia and Russia, which forbids Persia under the terms of Article 8 to have vessels in the waters of the Caspian Sea, is abrogated in accordance with the principles set forth in Article 1 of the present Treaty, the two High Contracting Parties shall enjoy equal rights of free navigation on that Sea, under their own flags, as from the date of the signing of the present Treaty.

ARTICLE 12

The Russian Federal Government, having officially renounced all economic interests obtained by military preponderance, further declares that, apart from the concessions which form the subject of Articles 9 and 10, the other concessions obtained by force by the Tsarist Government and its subjects shall also be regarded as null and void.

In conformity with which the Russian Federal Government restores, as from the date of the signing of the present Treaty, to the Persian Government, as representing the Persian people, all the concessions in question, whether already being worked or not, together with all land taken over in virtue of those concessions.

Of the lands and properties situated in Persia and belonging to the former Tsarist Government, only the premises of the Russian Legation at Teheran and at Zerguendeh with all movable and immovable appurtenances, as well as all real and other property of the Consulates and Vice-Consulates, shall be retained by Russia. Russia abandons, however, her right to administer the village of Zerguendeh, which was assigned by the ex-Government of the Tsar.

ARTICLE 13

The Persian Government, for its part, promises not to cede to a third Power, or to its subjects, the concessions and property restored to Persia by virtue of the present Treaty, and to maintain those rights for the Persian nation.

ARTICLE 14

The Persian Government, recognizing the importance of the Caspian fisheries for the food supply of Russia, promises to conclude with the Food Service of the Russian Socialist Federal Soviet Republic immediately upon the expiry of the legal period of these

existing engagements, a contract relating to the fisheries, containing appropriate clauses. Furthermore, the Persian Government promises to examine, in agreement with the Government of the Russian Socialist Federal Soviet Republic, the means of at once conveying the produce of the fisheries to the Food Service of Soviet Russia pending the conclusion of the above contract.

ARTICLE 15

In accordance with the principle of liberty of conscience proclaimed by Soviet Russia, and with a desire to put an end, in Moslem countries, to religious propaganda, the real object of which was to exercise political influence over the masses and thus to satisfy the rapacity of the Tsarist Government, the Government of Soviet Russia declares that the religious settlements established in Persia by the former Tsarist Governments are abolished. Soviet Russia will take steps to prevent such missions from being sent to Persia in the future.

Soviet Russia cedes unconditionally to the nation represented by the Persian Government, the lands, property and buildings belonging to the Orthodox Mission situated at Urmiah, together with the other similar establishments. The Persian Government shall use these properties for the construction of schools and other institutions intended for educational purposes.

ARTICLE 16

By virtue of the communications from Soviet Russia dated 25th June, 1919, with reference to the abolition of consular jurisdictions, it is decided that Russian subjects in Persia and Persian subjects in Russia shall, as from the date of the present Treaty, be placed upon the same footing as the inhabitants of the towns in which they reside; they shall be subject to the laws of their country of residence, and shall submit their complaints to the local courts.

ARTICLE 17

Persian subjects in Russia and Russian subjects in Persia shall be exempt from military service and from all military taxation.

ARTICLE 18

Persian subjects in Russia and Russian subjects in Persia shall, as regards travel within the respective countries, enjoy the rights granted to the most favoured nations other than the countries allied to them.

ARTICLE 19

Within a short period after the signature of the present Treaty, the two High Contracting Parties shall resume commercial relations. The methods to be adopted for the organization of the import and export of goods originating in Russia, shall be determined, under a commercial convention, by a special commission consisting of representatives of the two High Contracting Parties.

ARTICLE 20

Each of the two High Contracting Parties grants to the other the right of transit for the transport of goods passing through Persia or Russia and consigned to a third country.

The dues exacted in such cases shall not be higher than those levied on the goods of the most favoured nations other than the countries allied to the Russian Socialist Federal Soviet Republic.

ARTICLE 21

The two High Contracting Parties shall open telegraphic and postal relations between Russia and Persia within the shortest possible period after the signature of the present Treaty.

The conditions of these relations shall be fixed by a postal and telegraphic convention.

ARTICLE 22

In order to consolidate the good relations between the two neighbouring Powers and to facilitate the realization of the friendly intentions of each country towards the other, each of the High Contracting Parties shall, immediately after the signature of the present Treaty, be represented in the capital of the other by a Plenipotentiary Representative, who shall enjoy the rights of extraterritoriality and other privileges to which diplomatic representatives are entitled by international law and usage and by the regulations and customs of the two countries.

ARTICLE 23

In order to develop their mutual relations, the two High Contracting Parties shall establish Consulates in places to be determined by common agreement.

The rights and duties of the Consuls shall be fixed by a special agreement to be concluded without delay after the signature of the present Treaty. This agreement shall conform to the provisions in force in the two countries with regard to consular establishments.

ARTICLE 24

This Treaty shall be ratified within a period of three months. The exchange of ratifications shall take place at Teheran as soon as possible.

ARTICLE 25

The present Treaty is drawn up in Russian and Persian. Both texts shall be regarded as originals and both shall be authentic.

ARTICLE 26

The present Treaty shall come into force immediately upon signature.

In faith whereof the undersigned have signed the present Treaty and have affixed their seals thereto.

Done at Moscow, 26th February, 1921.

(Signed) G. TCHITCHERIN.
L. KARAKHAN.
MOCHAVEROL-MEMALEK.

No. 2654

ANNEX 1

Teheran, 12th December, 1921

Sir,

The Persian Government and the Mejlis have observed that Articles 5 and 6 of the Treaty concluded between our two countries are worded vaguely; the Mejlis, moreover, desires that the retrocession of Russian concessions to the Persian Government should be made without reserve or condition, and that Article 20 should be so worded as to allow the Persian Government full powers for the transit of imports and exports. Conversations have taken place with you on these questions, and you have given explanations with regard to Articles 5 and 6 and promises concerning Articles 13 and 20, to the effect that if the Treaty were passed by the Mejlis you would give all the assistance in your power to ensure that the two Articles in question should be revised on the lines desired by the Mejlis and the Persian Government. The Persian Government and the Mejlis are most desirous that friendly relations should be re-established between our two Governments, and that the Treaty, which is based upon the most amicable sentiments, should be concluded as soon as possible.

I have, therefore, the honour to request you to give in writing your explanations with regard to the interpretation of Articles 5 and 6, and to repeat the promise of support which you have already given as regards the revision of Articles 13 and 20, in order that the Persian Government may be enabled to secure the passing of the Treaty by the Mejlis.

I also wish to ask you to take the necessary steps to repair the error which has been made in Article 3, in which the word "commission" was written instead of "treaty," as the only Treaty which was concluded in 1881 was a frontier Treaty, and this is the Treaty referred to in Article 3.

I have the honour to be, Sir, etc.

(Signed) MOCHAROS-SALTANEH.

No. 1600

ANNEX 2

Teheran, 12th December, 1921

Your Excellency,

In reply to your letter dated 20th day of Ghows, I have the honour to inform you that Articles 5 and 6 are intended to apply only to cases in which preparations have been made for a considerable armed attack upon Russia or the Soviet Republics allied to her, by the partisans of the regime which has been overthrown or by its supporters among those foreign Powers which are in a position to assist the enemies of the Workers' and Peasants' Republics and at the same time to possess themselves, by force or by underhand methods, of part of the Persian territory, thereby establishing a base of operations for any attacks—made either directly or through the counter-revolutionary forces—which they might meditate against Russia or the Soviet Republics allied to her. The Articles referred to are therefore in no sense intended to apply to verbal or written attacks directed against the Soviet Government by the various Persian groups, or even by any Russian *émigrés* in Persia, in so far as such attacks are generally tolerated as between neighbouring Powers animated by sentiments of mutual friendship.

With regard to Articles 13 and 20, and the small error to which you draw attention in Article 3 with reference to the Convention of 1881, I am in a position to state categorically, as I have always stated, that my Government, whose attitude towards the Persian nation is entirely friendly, has never sought to place any restrictions upon the progress and prosperity of Persia. I myself fully share this

attitude, and would be prepared, should friendly relations be maintained between the two countries, to promote negotiations with a view to a total or partial revision of these Articles on the lines desired by the Persian Government, as far as the interests of Russia permit.

In view of the preceding statements, I trust that, as you promised me in your letter, your Government and the Mejlis will ratify the Treaty in question as soon as possible.

I have the honour to be, Your Excellency, etc.

(Signed) ROTHSTEIN.
Diplomatic Representative of the
Russian Socialist Federal Soviet Republic.

APPENDIX III

WAR SUPPLIES SENT TO THE SOVIET UNION VIA PERSIA

1. Between September 1941 and April 1945 Aid to Russia carried through the Persian Gulf had amounted to five million tons. This vast total of military and civil supplies included armaments, aviation and M.T. spirit, medical supplies and food, industrial equipment and war materials.

2. Of these 5,000,000 tons, 800,000 tons were carried over the west Persian route via Khanaqin by the United Kingdom Commercial Corporation.

3. The peak total carried in one month was 292,028 tons in July 1944.

4. The following detailed figures are available of supplies carried up to 11th June, 1944:

(a) WEAPONS AND AMMUNITION

Aircraft	5,826
Tanks	5,480
A.A. guns	562
Anti-tank guns	548
Shells	17,827,000
Cartridges	324,800,000
Minesweepers	12
Devices for detection of U-boats	116

(b) MEANS OF TRANSPORT

Lorries	8,649
Artillery wireless installations	214

(c) RAW MATERIALS

Rubber	103,500 tons
Aluminium	71,700 "
Copper	56,900 "
Lead	56,800 "
Jute, etc.	93,000 "
Zinc	14,100 "
Nickel	4,000 "

Steel (including rails)	13,300 tons
Tin	29,400 "
Cobalt	245 "
High explosives	22,300 "

(d) INDUSTRIAL EQUIPMENT

Power plant (in kilowatts)	...	374,000
Electric motors	...	15,084
Metal cutting lathes	...	6,491
Presses and hammers	...	104
Cranes	...	24
Diamonds (value in £)	...	1,206,000

(e) CLOTHING AND FOOD SUPPLIES

Food	...	346,800 tons
Boots	...	3,000,000 pairs
Great-coat cloth	...	1,600,000 tons

APPENDIX IV

SECURITY COUNCIL DOCUMENTS

19TH JANUARY—1ST FEBRUARY, 1946

LETTER FROM HEAD OF IRANIAN DELEGATION TO MR. JEBB

Iranian Delegation to the First
General Assembly of the U.N.

19th January, 1946

Gladwyn Jebb, Esq., C.M.G.,
Acting Secretary General,
United Nations.

Sir,

(1) Owing to interference of the Soviet Union, through the medium of their officials and armed forces, in the internal affairs of Iran, a situation has arisen which may lead to international friction.

(2) In accordance with Article 33 of the Charter of the United Nations the Iranian Government have repeatedly tried to negotiate with the Government of the Soviet Union, but have met with no success.

(3) Accordingly, the Iranian delegation to the General Assembly of the United Nations, on behalf of the Iranian Government, have the honour to request you, in accordance with the terms of Article 35 (1) of the Charter, to bring the matter to the attention of the Security Council so that the Council may investigate the situation and recommend appropriate terms of settlement.

(4) The Iranian delegation is prepared to assist the Security Council by furnishing a full statement of the facts which have given rise to the present situation, together with a copy of the relevant Treaty which binds the parties concerned.

I have the honour to be, Sir,

Your obedient servant,

(Signed) S. H. TAQIZADEH,

Head of the Iranian Delegation.

LETTER FROM THE CHIEF OF THE DELEGATION OF THE SOVIET UNION
TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

Soviet Delegation,
13 Kensington Palace Gardens,
London, W.8.

24th January, 1946

Dear Mr. Makin,

The delegation of the Soviet Union, acting on behalf of the Soviet Government, considers it necessary, in connection with the appeal of the Iranian delegation addressed to the Security Council to make the following statement:

(1) The allegation of the Iranian delegation of interference by the Soviet Union through its officials and through its armed forces in the internal affairs of Iran, is in contradiction with the reality and lacks any foundation. In this particular case the Iranian delegation repeats the statement made by the Iranian Government to the Soviet Government in November 1945. This statement, however, was categorically refuted by the Soviet Embassy in Iran in its Note of 26th November. It should be noted also that in its reply of 1st December, 1945, the Iranian Government not only failed to disprove the facts referred to in the Soviet Note of 26th November, but also expressed, as is stated in the above-mentioned Iranian Note, "its satisfaction in connection with the fact, which was confirmed by the contents of the reply note of the Embassy, that the interference of the Soviet officials into the internal affairs of Iran in northern regions is not in accordance with the facts." Moreover, in the same note the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Iran "expressed its satisfaction at the fact, that as has been pointed out, the Soviet officials fully respect the Tripartite Agreement and the Declaration of the leaders of the three great Powers and allied with Iran, signed and published in Teheran." These facts bear witness quite convincingly to the incorrectness and groundlessness of the statement of the Iranian delegation regarding the alleged interference on the part of the Soviet Union in the internal affairs of Iran.

(2) Equally in contradiction with reality is the statement of the Iranian delegation concerning the fact that the Iranian Government has attempted to initiate negotiations on the above-mentioned question with the Soviet Government which were fruitless. The above-mentioned facts refute this statement of the Iranian delegation because the Iranian Government not only attempted to negotiate but actually did negotiate with the Soviet Government on this question, as can be seen from the Iranian Note of 1st December referred to above.

(3) The Soviet delegation considers it necessary to point out that the Iranian Government is trying to use the presence of foreign troops in Iran in order to represent this fact as a violation of Iranian sovereignty and as a cause of the events which are taking place in the Iranian Azerbaijan. As a matter of fact, the presence of Soviet troops on the territory of Iran is quite legitimate in so far as such a right is granted to the Soviet Government by the Soviet-Iranian Treaty of 26th February, 1921, and Soviet-British-Iranian Treaty of 1942. The events in Iranian Azerbaijan have no connection with the presence there of Soviet troops, and this is confirmed by indisputable and quite objective facts. These events are of an exclusively Iranian and internal nature. As it is known, what is happening in Northern Iran is a demonstration of the aspiration of the population of Northern Iran for national autonomy within the limits of the Iranian State, and of the achievement of the wishes of the local population which is nothing unusual for a democratic country.

(4) At the same time, the Soviet delegation cannot fail to draw attention to the fact that propaganda hostile to the Soviet Union is growing stronger in Iran and is far from being discouraged by the Iranian Government. This propaganda does not differ in any sense from the Fascist propaganda which was instigated against the Soviet Union at the time of Reza Shah. Anti-democratic and pogrom activity on the part of reactionary forces in Iran, hostile to the Soviet Union; which is supported by certain influential Iranian groups drawn from the ruling classes and the police authorities, creates for Azerbaijan and for Baku a danger of organized hostile actions, diversions and so forth. Such a situation cannot be tolerated. However, the Soviet Government thinks that such questions which affect the relations between two neighbouring states, the U.S.S.R. and Iran, can and should be settled by means of bilateral negotiations between the Soviet Government and the Iranian Government. The Soviet Government did not and does not refuse to accept this method of settling such disputes arising between neighbours.

(5) In view of these facts, and taking also into consideration that in this particular case the conditions envisaged by Articles 34 and 35 of the Charter of the United Nations Organization are not present, the Soviet delegation regards the appeal of the Iranian delegation to the Security Council as lacking grounds and categorically opposed to the consideration of the mentioned appeal of the Iranian delegation by the Security Council.

(Signed) A. VYSHINSKY,
Chief of the Delegation
of the Soviet Union.

LETTER FROM THE CHIEF OF THE DELEGATION OF IRAN TO THE
PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL (S/1)

26th January, 1946

Sir,

The Iranian delegation to the General Assembly of the United Nations have taken note of the letter of 24th January, 1946, addressed by the delegation of the Soviet Union to the Security Council the following facts:

(1) The continued interference of Soviet military and civil authorities in the internal affairs of Iran can be fully proved. The statement of the facts showing this interference and containing the necessary proofs will be submitted to the Security Council. The Iranian Government has in fact brought many instances of such interference to the notice of the Soviet Government in a number of Notes which the Soviet Government have either completely ignored or failed to deal adequately with the complaint.

(2) While it is true that the Soviet Government in its Note of 26th November, 1945, contrary to the true facts, categorically denied the allegations of interference contained in the Note of the Iranian Government of 17th November, yet it remains the fact that in their Note of 26th November, 1945, the Soviet Government admitted that they had not been willing to allow the passage of Iranian reinforcements to suppress the revolt in Azerbaijan on the clearly unjustifiable grounds that, according to the Soviet Government, the arrival of Iranian troops in part of their own territory would cause disturbance and bloodshed and that in the event of the outbreak of disturbances the Soviet Government would, to maintain security in the areas stationed by her armed forces, be constrained to complement her armed forces. Later, however, in the Soviet Government Note to the United States Government dated 29th November, 1945, they tried to find a new excuse for their action alleging that it was a "matter of aspirations with respect to the assurances of the democratic rights of Azerbaijanian population of northern Iran which is seeking national autonomy within the limits of the Iranian State," which point is now reiterated in paragraph 3 of the letter of the delegation of the Soviet Union to the Security Council.

The above reasons given by the Soviet Union are so utterly without foundation that the Iranian delegation do not feel called upon to advance refutation. It is perhaps useful to remind the Soviet delegation of the substance of a well-known speech delivered by M. Litvinoff, on behalf of the Soviet Government, at the General Commission of the Disarmament Conference at Geneva on 6th February, 1933, in which in a remarkably clear and precise manner he gave a definition of an aggressor nation. M. Litvinoff said:

"No considerations whatsoever of a political, strategical or economic nature, including the desire to exploit natural riches or to obtain any sort of advantage or privileges on the territory of another state, no references to considerable capital investments or other especial interests in a given state, or the alleged absence of certain attributes of State organization in the case of a given country, shall be accepted as justification of aggression.

"Nor do the following situations allow any nation to become an aggressor:

The internal situation in a given State, as for instance: political, economic or cultural backwardness of a given country.

Alleged mal-administration.

A revolutionary or counter-revolutionary movement, civil war, or disorders or strikes.

The establishment or maintenance in any State of any political or social order."

The refusal by the Soviet Government to allow the passage of Iranian security forces to go through part of Iranian territory is clearly a breach of the Tripartite Treaty of Alliance of 1924 and the Declaration of Teheran, by which the Allied Powers undertook to respect the territorial integrity, the sovereignty, and political independence of Iran. It is expressly stated in the Tripartite Treaty that "the presence of Allied forces on Iranian territory does not constitute a military occupation and should disturb as little as possible the administration of the security forces of Iran, the economic life of the country, the normal movements of the population and the application of Iranian laws and regulations."

(3) It is to be noted that both the United States Government and the British Government made representations to the Soviet Government in a Note of 24th November, 1945, and a letter of 27th November respectively in which both these Powers stated that Iran had full freedom without interference from the Allied civil or military authorities to move its forces through Iran whenever necessary to maintain order in their own territory. The United States Government expressed the confidence that instructions to this effect would be issued by the Soviet Government to the Soviet Commander in Iran whilst the British Government stated that they were disturbed that Iranian forces had been stopped by the Soviet authorities and felt that the action of the Soviet military authorities in halting such forces on their way to Azerbaijan must be due to some misunderstanding of the position.

(4) The Iranian Note of 1st December, 1945, to which the Soviet delegation refers, was in answer to the Soviet Note of 26th November, 1945, which Note was in turn a reply to several written representa-

tions by the Iranian Government that Iranian troops destined for Azerbaijan had been prevented from proceeding by Soviet military authorities. The Iranian Note of 1st December is not correctly quoted or translated from the Persian in the letter of the Soviet delegation. The sense has been so altered that it is exactly the opposite of what was said in the Note. It is not true that the Iranian Government as alleged in paragraph 1 of the Soviet letter to the Security Council, expressed its satisfaction in connection with the "fact . . . that the interference of the Soviet officials . . . is not in accordance with the facts." The Iranian Government intimated that it understood from the Soviet Note of 26th November that such incidents would not be *repeated*, and it was on this understanding that the Iranian Government expressed their satisfaction. The actual text of this passage is as follows:

"In answer to the communication in which you reply that the charges made concerning the interference of Soviet officials in our internal affairs, in the northern provinces, are unfounded, the Ministry for Foreign Affairs does not wish at this time to give further explanations in this matter and to throw more light on the antecedents of the case. It takes note with satisfaction of the purport of your statements to the effect that henceforth such incidents *will not repeat themselves*."

Thus the text shows that the Government of Iran was expressing its satisfaction not with the fact that no interference on the part of the Soviet authorities had occurred but that in future they would not repeat such interference.

Again, the passage from the Iranian Note of 1st December, 1945, quoted in the penultimate sentence of paragraph 1 of the letter of the Soviet delegation is not correctly set out. The Iranian Government in that passage expressed its satisfaction at the assurance that the Soviet officials respected the Tripartite Treaty and the Teheran Declaration but the Note did not express any agreement with the statement that the Soviet officials had in fact respected these obligations. The text is as follows:

"Your assurance that the officials of the Soviet Union fully respect the provisions of the Tripartite Treaty and of the Declaration signed in Teheran by the three great Powers who and the Allies of Iran, is also a source of gratification."

The Iranian Government in its anxiety to avoid any dispute with the Soviet Government were willing if these incident did not occur again to avoid any discussion as to the past, but nowhere in the Iranian Note of 1st December is there any agreement on the part of the Iranian Government that the interferences by the Soviet Government in the internal affairs of Iran had not taken place. In fact, in two passages besides the one referred to above, the Iranian

Government stated that they hoped that such actions on the part of the Soviet Military authorities in the Northern Provinces would not longer take place; that the interferences on the part of the Soviet Government in the affairs of the Northern Provinces *would* cease and that the security forces of Iran would not be stopped from moving freely. These were all expressions of hope that in future what had taken place in the past, namely, the unwarranted actions of the Soviet Government, would no longer occur. A translation of the whole Iranian note of 1st December is attached hereto to show that the Soviet delegation did not correctly quote its terms or draw the correct conclusions from its language.

(5) As regards the statement in paragraph 2 of the letter from the Soviet delegation, that the Iranian Government negotiated this question with the Soviet Government, the Iranian delegation repeats that the attempts on the part of the Iranian Government to negotiate with the Soviet Government were unsuccessful. The Iranian Government in a note of 17th November, 1945, informed the Soviet Government that they were sending troops to Azerbaijan to restore law and order. In notes dated 22nd and 23rd November, 1945, the Iranian Government notified the Soviet Government that the troops destined for Azerbaijan had been halted by Soviet authorities and requested that these troops should be allowed passage immediately.

The Iranian Government, in the middle of December, 1945, went so far as to offer that the Prime Minister of Iran should go with the Minister for Foreign Affairs to Moscow to discuss these matters, but the offer was ignored by the Soviet Government.

As stated above, the Soviet note of 26th November admitted that passage had been refused because the Soviet Government did not consider the presence of Iranian reinforcements advisable. In the Iranian note of 1st December referred to above the request was repeated that all obstacles be removed in the way of detachments of Iranian troops which had been halted since 20th November by the Soviet forces. Such request has never been granted. Finally, on 15th December, 1945, the Iranian Government in a Note addressed to the three powers asked that foreign military forces should abstain from impeding the free movement of Iranian forces.

As the Iranian Government clearly has the right, both under international law and under the Tripartite Treaty of Alliance and under the Declaration of Teheran to send these forces to Azerbaijan, there can be no question of any negotiations with the Soviet Government other than the agreement by the Soviet Government to the request of the Iranian Government that the forces should be allowed to proceed. The Iranian note of 1st December repeated the request already urgently expressed to allow uninterrupted passage to these troops; it cannot therefore be maintained in view of the categorical

refusal contained in the Soviet note of 26th November that the question was negotiated as intimated in the letter of the Soviet delegation.

(6) The Iranian Government has not tried to use the presence of foreign troops in order to represent this fact as a breach of Iranian sovereignty but has maintained that their continued presence without a *raison d'être* together with the conduct of those troops in indulging in unwarranted interference in the internal affairs of Iran in definite breach of the Soviet Government's treaty undertakings, is a direct cause of the inability of the Iranian Government to restore law and order in Azerbaijan. The Iranian Government in its letter to the Security Council has not raised the question of the withdrawal of the Soviet forces. The delegation feels, however, that it should be stated that the Iranian Government in their Note to the Soviet Government holds the view which was expressed by the United States Government in their note to the Soviet Government of 24th November that the *raison d'être* for the presence of foreign troops in Iran has disappeared and that it is desirable that all foreign troops should leave Iranian territory immediately, thus following the example set by the United States Government as regards their forces. The Treaty provides that foreign troops *may* remain until six months after the end of the war but does not require that they shall do so. The Treaty of 1921 to which the Soviet delegation has alluded is not relevant to the presence of Soviet troops in Iran. The provision of the Treaty as to the entry of Soviet troops on Iranian territory is not only contrary to the spirit of the Charter of the United Nations, but apart from that is only meant to apply to the case where Iran is occupied by a hostile power and by reason of this fact Iranian territory becomes a base of aggression against the U.S.S.R., and in that event only if the Iranian Government could not eliminate this danger by its own action, is Russian intervention allowed. There can be no question of the Treaty being invoked in the present instance since no hostile third parties exist and the Iranian Government is able to deal effectively with any situation that has arisen if it is allowed by the Soviet authorities to send its troops and officials to the disaffected area. Further, the Treaty has no bearing on the Soviet troops stationed at present on Iranian territory since the Treaty of Alliance of 1942 expressly provides for their withdrawal without any reference being possible to the Treaty of 1921.

However, the withdrawal of the Soviet troops is not the question before the Security Council. The present dispute with the Soviet Government arises out of the fact that Iranian authorities have not been allowed by the Soviet authorities to carry out their duties of administering law and order in the areas in which Soviet troops

are stationed. The Iranian Government requests that these troops and officials should be given free passage and that Soviet authorities should be instructed to place no obstacles in their way.

(7) The Iranian delegation denies that there is any propaganda hostile to the Soviet Union in Iran or that it has been encouraged by the Iranian Government. Even in spite of the violent propaganda on the part of the Moscow press and radio against the Iranian Government there have been no similar polemics on the part of the Iranian press. It is true that the Soviet authorities in Iran have sometimes disingenuously characterized opposition to the interferences of the Soviet authorities in Iranian internal affairs as anti-Soviet activity. Attack is the best form of defence! In order, however, that there should be no possible grounds of disagreement on this score between the Iranian and Soviet Governments the Iranian delegation invited the Soviet Government to furnish all details of such propaganda, which details have not so far been given, in order that full inquiry may be made as to any unjustified propaganda activities or abuse of the right of free speech.

(8) In the circumstances the Iranian delegation maintain that the conditions envisaged by Article 25 of the Charter are present and that the Security Council should, in accordance with the terms of the Charter, investigate this dispute between the Iranian Government and the Soviet Government.

Yours sincerely,

(Signed) S. H. TAQIZADEH,

Head of the Iranian Delegation.

The Hon. Mr. N. J. O. Makin,
President of the Security Council,
United Nations.

ANNEX

*Note from the Ministry for Foreign Affairs to the Soviet Embassy,
Teheran*

*Date. 10 Azar, 1324.
(1st December, 1945).*

"In answer to the communication in which you reply that the charges made concerning the interference of Soviet officials in our internal affairs, in the Northern Provinces, are unfounded, the Ministry for Foreign Affairs does not wish at this time to give further explanations in this matter and to throw more light on the antecedents of the case. It takes note with satisfaction of the purport of your statements to the effect that henceforth such incidents *will not repeat themselves*.

Your assurance that the officials of the Soviet Union fully respect the provisions of the Tripartite Treaty and the Declaration signed in Teheran by the three great Powers (and who are the allies of Iran), is also a source of gratification.

The Ministry for Foreign Affairs hopes that, with the assistance of the Soviet Embassy, and with the immediate and complete evacuation of Iranian territory by the Red Army—and we expect the same of the two other friendly and allied governments—such actions on the part of the Soviet military authorities in the Northern Provinces *will no longer take place*. In this way the friendship between Iran and the Soviet Union will be increased.

As regards your statement that the Soviet Union cannot be held responsible for the grave consequences of the absence of Iranian officials in the Northern Provinces, we are compelled to point out that the presence of officials in those regions can only be useful and effective if Persian security forces are placed at their disposal and if it is possible to move those forces from localities where they are not required to places where their assistance is needed. When the hands of Government officials are tied whereas irresponsible turbulent elements move about freely, and when the security forces of Iran are deprived of liberty of action and communication with the Central Government, it is not to be wondered at that the situation becomes troubled and that Government officials share the lot of the inhabitants of the Northern Provinces and are exposed to the danger of being assaulted, wounded and murdered. Such unfortunate incidents have, in fact, frequently taken place.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs is hopeful that, in accordance with the assurance given by the Soviet Embassy, the interference in the affairs of the Northern Provinces *will cease* and that the security forces of Iran *will be able* to move about freely; only in this way can order and tranquillity be restored in those regions.

At the same time the Ministry wishes to inform the Embassy that the strengthening and reinforcement of the security forces of the country in the provinces cannot, as would seem to be the contention of the Soviet Embassy, give rise to anxiety and should not in any way afford an excuse for bringing fresh troops from the Soviet Union to Iran. Indeed, the Iranian Government's request and expectations are that the detachments of the Red Army still remaining in Iran as well as those of other allied countries shall evacuate our territory with the least possible delay and return to their respective countries so as to enable the Imperial Government of Iran to provide for the well-being and tranquillity of all its people.

The object of the security or military forces of Persia has not been and is not to quarrel or to resort to strife with the local inhabitants, but rather to prevent incitement to disturbances and

indiscriminate shooting and abuses. The purpose of these forces is to exercise vigilance in maintaining law and order.

In this way it will soon be possible to bring about the appeasement of the Northern regions of Iran and officials of the Government will be able to attend to and investigate the legitimate requests or grievances of any individual in conformity with the Constitution and other laws of the land.

In view of what has been said, the Ministry for Foreign Affairs in conclusion, requests the Soviet Embassy to be good enough to inform it of the urgent steps which the Embassy will be taking to ensure freedom of movement for the military and civil authorities in the Northern Provinces as well as the unhindered transportation from one locality to another of the security and military forces of Iran in general. It is requested, in particular, that all obstacles be removed in the way of the detachment which has been waiting at Charifabad with orders to proceed to the Northern Provinces."

*Speeches by the Delegates of Iran and the Soviet Union,
28th January, 1946*

MR. TAQIZADEH (Iran): I am handing in a memorandum setting out the contentions of the Iranian Government in the dispute which has arisen between the Iranian Government and the Soviet Government and which has been brought by the Iranian Government to the attention of the Security Council under Article 35 of the Charter in a note dated 19th January, 1946 communicated to Mr. Gladwyn Jebb, acting Secretary-General.

I would like to emphasize that the Iranian Government regrets no less than any other Member Government of the United Nations that the Organization has been faced at the commencement of its work with the situation in Iran and should have to deal with a dispute between two of its Members. The Iranian Government sincerely deploras that they find themselves in dispute with a country with whom they not only have a long-standing friendship, but who is also their ally under the Tripartite Treaty of Alliance of 29th January, 1942. Iran helped in no small measure towards Soviet victory by placing her entire resources at the disposal of the Allies for the prosecution of the war and very considerable quantities of war supplies reached the Soviet Union by what was then the most exclusive route of Iran. Iranian railways, roads and all means of transport were utilized for this purpose, even at the cost of depriving the Iranian population of food supplies. I would remind the Council of the fact that the assistance given by Iran in the prosecution of the war against the common enemy, particularly by facilitating the transportation of supplies from overseas to the Soviet Union, was

officially recognized in the Teheran Declaration signed on 1st December, 1943, by Mr. Churchill, Marshal Stalin and President Roosevelt. Iran broke off diplomatic relations with the Axis Powers, Germany and Italy, in September 1941, and it declared war on Germany on 9th September, 1943, and on Japan towards the end of February, 1945.

The memorandum which I am handing in sets out the facts which are relevant to this most unfortunate dispute. It will be seen that the Iranian Government has sought a solution of this dispute by direct approach to the Soviet Government and, in accordance with Article 33 of the Charter, to reach this solution by negotiation. As you will see from the appendices to the memorandum, the Iranian Government has addressed a number of notes to the Soviet Government setting out the interventions on the part of the Soviet authorities in her internal affairs in breach of Iranian independence and sovereignty and has requested the Soviet Government to discuss and remedy these matters, but the Soviet Government has either not replied to these notes or has found itself unable to admit the protests of the Iranian Government. Further, the Iranian Prime Minister offered in December 1945 to proceed to Moscow accompanied by the Iranian Foreign Minister in order to arrive at a settlement with the Soviet Government. This offer was ignored. In the light of the refusal of the Soviet Government either to discuss these matters or to cease these disturbances in Iran internal affairs the only course for the Iranian Government was to bring the dispute to the attention of the Security Council as a situation which might lead to international friction.

The detailed circumstances which have given rise to this situation are set out in the memorandum. It is therein shown that in breach of international law and of the Tripartite Treaty of Alliance between the Soviet Union, Great Britain and Iran of 29th January, 1942, contrary to the Three-Power Declaration by the United States of America, Great Britain and the U.S.S.R., concerning Iran, made at the Teheran Conference in December 1943, and contrary to the principles embodied in the Preamble of the Charter of the United Nations, there have been a number of interventions in Iranian internal affairs by the Soviet authorities. Although the Tripartite Treaty provides that the presence of the Allied forces on Iranian territory does not constitute a military occupation and that it shall disturb, as little as possible, the administration and security forces of Iran, the economic life of the country, the normal movements of the population and the application of Iranian laws and regulations, nevertheless the Soviet authorities have disturbed the administration of Iran by interfering with it in the zone where Soviet troops are stationed. In Azerbaijan this policy has been carried so far that

the Iranian Government has been prevented from exercising any power whatsoever in this part of Iran; the security forces of Iran have been prevented from exercising their proper functions of suppressing disorders; the Soviet authorities have disrupted the economic life of the country by setting up at the frontier of the so-called Soviet zone internal barriers which all merchandise and civilians were only allowed to pass at the discretion of the Soviet authorities; no armed forces of the Iranian Government were allowed to proceed beyond these limits. The Soviet authorities have prevented the Iranian authorities from applying Iranian laws and regulations in these areas, in some cases by applying their own ruling, in others by forbidding the local authorities to enforce the law of Iran.

While the Iranian Government to a certain extent tolerated these breaches of territory and international law during the war, it is their contention that, now that the war is over, an end should certainly be made of these interferences of Iran's independence and sovereignty. Since the end of the war certain unruly elements in Azerbaijan have sought to cause dissension and disturbances. It would have been an easy matter for the Iranian Government to carry out its duty of re-establishing order, if it had been possible for the security forces to proceed to these affected areas. This access was denied, and Iranian troops were halted at the Russian barriers. This, in the submission of the Iranian Government, is clearly an interference in the internal affairs of Iran. It will be seen from the memorandum that this is only one instance among many. The result has been that whole districts are no longer under the control of the central Government who, owing to the action of the Soviet authorities, are not able to send troops or officials to these parts. As such action on the part of the Soviet authorities is in contravention of the Tripartite Treaty, the Iranian Government urge that the Security Council recommend that the terms of the Tripartite Treaty be strictly adhered to; that until the evacuation of Soviet troops from Iranian territory is duly completed, according to their obligations, no action be taken by the Soviet authorities in Iran, with regard to this Treaty, or to the Teheran Declaration, and that troops and officials be allowed to carry out their normal functions of government, and that the authority of the central Government be not interfered with in any way by the Soviet forces or officials in Iran. The Iranian Government also asks that the Security Council should recommend the withdrawal by the Soviet authorities of all moral and material support to the rebels in Azerbaijan or dissident elements elsewhere.

It will be within the recollection of two members of the Security Council, namely, the United States of America and Great Britain,

that each Government on being informed that Soviet troops had prevented Iranian security forces from proceeding to Azerbaijan, made representations to the Soviet Government that the Government of Iran should have full freedom to send its armed forces to any part of Iran in order to maintain order in their own territory. The representation of the United States was contained in a note dated 24th November, 1945, delivered by the United States Ambassador in Moscow to the Soviet Government. This note, after invoking the treaty of alliance and the Declaration of Teheran, stated that the fulfilment of the assurances given at Teheran required that "the Government of Iran should have full freedom, without interference from Soviet, British or American military or civil authorities, to move its armed forces through Iran in such a manner as it may consider necessary in order to preserve its authority and to maintain internal security."

The representations of Great Britain which were contained in a letter dated 27th November, 1945, from the British Ambassador in Moscow to Mr. Molotov, the Soviet Commissar for Foreign Affairs, also referred to the Teheran Declaration and stated that it seemed reasonable to the British Government that the Iranian Government should wish to maintain order in their own territory and legitimate that they should move their forces about their own country to do so. The British Government stated that they trusted the Soviet Government would give instructions in this sense to their forces in Iran that they should not interfere with the Iranian Government in the exercise of their sovereign right of maintaining order in their own territory.

On 29th November, 1945, the Soviet Government answered the United States Government note of 24th November. The Soviet Government maintained that the events that had taken place in Northern Iran were not an armed uprising, were not directed against the Iranian Government, but had been caused by reactionary elements which have opposed the extension of national rights to the populations of Northern Iran.

As regards the Iranian security forces, the Soviet Government stated that it was not hindering the movement of forces which were already in the districts of Northern Iran but that they had opposed the dispatch of new Iranian troops to northern districts on the grounds that this would increase the disorders and the bloodshed and would further compel the Soviet Government to bring in more Soviet troops to preserve order and to assure the security of the Soviet garrison. As the Soviet Government considered the further introduction of Soviet forces into Iran as undesirable, it considered that the introduction of new Iranian forces into the Northern Provinces would serve no useful purpose.

It clearly appears from this note that the attitude of the Soviet Government is directly contrary to the Treaty of Alliance and to the Teheran Declaration. The Iranian Government, not the Soviet Government, is the judge of strength and nature of the disturbances in Azerbaijan, since the Soviet Government is bound under treaty not to interfere with the internal affairs of Iran. Therefore, the Soviet Government, by their admission that they did not regard the introduction of new troops into Iran as necessary, acknowledged that they had committed a breach of the Treaty of Alliance which provides that the stationing of Soviet troops is not a military occupation and that there should not be any interference in the internal affairs of Iran.

The Iranian Government had communicated directly with the Soviet Government on the subject of sending troops and officials to Northern Iran. In a note to the Soviet Government of 17th November, the Iranian Government notified the Soviet Government that instructions had been issued that the Governor-General and Governors of Azerbaijan should be sent out to fill their posts. In addition, orders had been given for the dispatch of troops to restore order. The Iranian Government requested the Soviet Government to give the necessary immediate instructions to the Soviet military authorities to refrain from interfering with the freedom of action of the Iranian army and constabulary. The Iranian Government warned that if urgent attention was not paid to these matters the situation was such that disastrous consequences might ensue and if unfortunate incidents occurred owing to lack of freedom of movement of its armed forces it would have the right to impute responsibility for this failure to the Soviet military authorities.

After the Iranian forces had been halted by the Soviet authorities on 21st November 1945, the Iranian Government addressed two notes on 22nd and 23rd November, 1945, respectively, requesting that telegraphic instructions might be given to the Soviet authorities immediately to let these forces go through.

On 26th November, the Soviet Government answered the urgent requests of the Iranian Government by stating, as mentioned above, that if the Iranian Government sent troops to Azerbaijan this would cause disturbance and bloodshed and that it was therefore not considered advisable to allow reinforcements to proceed to Azerbaijan.

The rest of the Soviet Government note was a categorical denial of numerous incidents of interferences which the Iranian Government had cited in their note of 17th November. The submission of the Soviet Government in their notes of 26th November to the Iranian Government and 29th November to the United States Government that they had prevented the dispatch of troops to Azerbaijan makes it unnecessary for me at this stage to deal with

the other numerous acts of interference by the Soviet military and civil authorities in the internal affairs, which acts are fully set out in the memorandum I am presenting to-day.

On 1st December, the Iranian Government addressed a reply to the Soviet Government in which satisfaction was expressed for the assurance implied in the Soviet note that these incidents would not be repeated; that the interference in the Northern Provinces would cease and that the security force would be able to move about freely. The Iranian Government asked that they should be informed of the urgent steps which the Soviet Embassy would be taking to ensure freedom of movement for the Iranian military and civil authorities in the Northern Provinces. Exception was taken to the statement of the Soviet Government in their note that they could not be held responsible for the absence of officials in those provinces, as the presence of those officials would only be useful if Iranian security forces were placed at their disposal.

As explained in my letter of 26th January to the Security Council the note of 1st December was in no sense a concluded negotiation. On the contrary, it maintained a request of the Iranian Government that the forces should be allowed to proceed to Northern Iran.

On 15th December, 1945, the eve of the conference of the three Foreign Ministers in Moscow, the Iranian Government addressed a note to Great Britain, the United States of America and the Soviet Union, asking for the complete and immediate evacuation of the territory by the Allied troops. Pending the fulfilment of this request, the Iranian Government asked that foreign military forces stationed in Iran should abstain from interfering with the free movement of Iranian security forces, so that security might be re-established.

In the circumstances the request of Iran, therefore, is that Soviet authorities should cease from interfering in the internal affairs of Iran and that Iranian forces and officials should not be prevented from proceeding freely in and through territory in which Soviet forces are stationed or from the full exercise of their duties, and more particularly that no hindrance should be put in the way of the Iranian security forces proceeding to Azerbaijan or to any part of Iran to restore law and order. In addition the Iranian Government request that the Soviet Government give the necessary instructions to effect complete withdrawal of all Soviet troops and officials by 2nd March, 1946.

I am confident that in the spirit of justice which animates the new world Organization and in accordance with the principle laid down in Article 2, paragraph 4, of the Charter of the United Nations, the Security Council will grant Iran's request that, pending the completion of the due withdrawal of the Soviet forces, Iran should have full freedom of action in its own territory.

I would like to add that in presenting these facts the Iranian delegation is animated with the desire for the maintenance of good relations with the Soviet Union. I have attempted to deal courteously and objectively with the facts of this unfortunate situation which it is the earnest hope of the Iranian delegation will be clarified in the cause of lasting friendship between the Soviet Union and Iran through the recommendation of the Security Council.

The PRESIDENT: I now invite the delegate for the Soviet Union to make such oral statements as might be wished in supplementation of, or in clarification of, the written note which has already been communicated to this Council.

M. VYSHINSKY (Soviet Union) (*Speaking in Russian; first translation*).

Note: The statement reproduced below is the translation of a text supplied by M. Vyshinsky after the meeting.

I think it necessary to make the following declaration. As I have already stated, I will leave on one side the questions of substance raised by the Iranian delegation and I will deal only with the procedural aspect. I will endeavour to bring proofs to disprove the facts put forward by that Iranian Government which is no longer in power and whose claims are entirely without foundation.

The questions raised by the Iranian Government are set forth in two Iranian statements but these questions cannot be discussed by the Security Council since they do not meet the conditions specified in the Charter. I shall also, however, have to touch on some questions of fact which have been put in an incorrect and tendentious light by the Iranian delegation. It is necessary to decide immediately whether the Security Council must or must not deal with the question raised by the former Iranian Government of Hakimi which obviously aimed at endeavouring to aggravate the relations existing between Iran and the Soviet Union.

As to the procedural aspect of the question, there are two main points. In the first place it must be established whether negotiations took place between the Iranian and Soviet Governments or not. In the second place the results of such negotiations must be considered. In the first declaration made by the Iranian delegate to the Security Council on 19th January, the Iranian delegation stated that the Iranian Government had repeatedly tried to negotiate with the Government of the Soviet Union but had met with no success. At present and in its second document, the Iranian delegation admits that the Iranian Government not only endeavoured to negotiate with the Soviet Government but that such negotiations actually took place. The Iranian delegation thus itself refutes its first statement.

There remains the second question, namely, what were the results of these negotiations.

In its statement of 24th January addressed to the Security Council the Soviet delegation pointed out that the Iranian Government, in its note of 1st December, expressed its satisfaction at the statement of the Soviet Government contained in its note of 26th November. The Iranian delegation points out the inaccuracy of the translation of the Iranian note, and endeavours to present the whole matter as if it were dissatisfied with the results of the exchange of notes between the Soviet Government and the Iranian Government in November of last year. I am not going to start a philological discussion and in general I do not intend to argue the correctness or incorrectness of the translation of the particular words referred to by the Iranian delegation. I will use the text of the Iranian Government's note of 1st December, which the Iranian delegation has sent to the members of the Security Council. This text shows, no matter how desirable it may be for the Iranian delegation to deny it, that the Iranian Government, through its Minister of Foreign Affairs, pointed with satisfaction to the contents of the statement mentioned in the Soviet Government's note of 26th November. On referring to this note, it is evident that the Soviet statement that the allegation of interference by Soviet officials in the internal affairs of Iran in the northern district was not in accordance with the facts and that, on the contrary, the Soviet note of 26th November contained no statement to the effect that "such incidents will not occur again in the future," as now asserted by the Iranian delegation. Indeed, how could the note of the Iranian Government, dated 1st December, express satisfaction at the statement of the Soviet Government that "incidents will not occur again" if the Soviet note with which the Iranian Government expressed its satisfaction did not contain such a statement that "incidents will not occur again"? Moreover, there are other passages in the Iranian note of 1st December which prove that the Iranian Government was at that time satisfied with the results of the negotiations.

The following statement of the Iranian Government is to be found in its note of 1st December. I am quoting it from the text submitted by Mr. Taqizadeh: "Your assurance (that is, the assurance of the Soviet Government contained in the note of 26th November) that the officials of the Soviet Union fully respect the terms of the Trilateral Treaty and the Declaration signed at Teheran by the three great Powers (which are Iran's allies) is also a source of satisfaction."

Thus, it is quite evident that the Iranian Government was satisfied with the results of the negotiations of November 1945 between the Soviet and Iranian Governments, on the question which the Iranian Government is now endeavouring to bring before the Security Council for consideration.

I must also point out that at that time, that is, in December 1945, the Iranian Government did not demonstrate its desire to continue the negotiations on this question. In proof of this, the following paragraphs of the same note of the Iranian Government of 1st December may be quoted:

"In reply to your letter," says the note, "in which you answer that the accusation of interference by Soviet officials in our internal affairs in the Northern Provinces, is groundless, the Minister of Foreign Affairs does not wish at the present time to give any further explanations of this question, or to re-examine the circumstances of this matter."

How can the Iranian delegation now contend that the attempts of the Iranian Government to start negotiations with the Soviet Government had no results?

From all that I have said, it is obvious that such results have been achieved. It will also be seen that the negotiations were not continued after 1st December because the Iranian Government did not desire it and obviously did not see the necessity for it. Indeed, in view of the facts referred to above, how can it be said that the negotiations between the Soviet Government and the Iranian Government were unsuccessful? The Soviet Government answers: No, this cannot be said. As a matter of fact, results were achieved and these results were such that the Iranian Government did not think it necessary to continue the negotiations.

The Iranian delegation also referred here to the notes bearing later dates in December, the 13th and 15th. These references of the Iranian delegation to the notes in question aim at showing that even after 1st December the Iranian Government approached the Soviet Government with similar claims which, allegedly, were not granted. But on referring to these notes, it would appear that they did not deal with the claims presented at an earlier date by the Iranian Government to the Soviet Government, but raised entirely new questions; namely that the Moscow Conference of Three Ministers should discuss the wishes of the Iranian Government regarding the withdrawal of foreign troops from Iran, that the Iranian Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs should be invited to Moscow in connection with the Moscow Conference, and that no decisions should be taken at the Moscow Conference without previous consultation with the Iranian Government. It may therefore be asserted that after 1st December the Iranian Government did not repeat its claims against the Soviet Union and that the reference to the notes of 13th and 15th December has no relation whatever to the question presented by the Iranian Government to the Security Council. As to the substance of these notes of December, in which the question of

the withdrawal of foreign troops from Iran is discussed, this matter was covered in the Treaty of 1942 which, as is known, laid down a definite time-limit for this purpose. It is also known that the Moscow Conference of Three Ministers of Foreign Affairs did not discuss Iranian questions and therefore the claims made by Hakimi at this time in connection with the fact that he was not invited to the Moscow Conference is unfounded.

I will summarize this part of my statement. I consider it to be proved that, in November 1945, negotiations on the claims presented by the Iranian Government did take place between the Soviet Government and the Iranian Government and that these negotiations had satisfactory results. Now the Iranian delegation, acting on the instructions of the Iranian Government, which, as is known, has been replaced by another Government, states that it does not consider these negotiations satisfactory. In this case, the Iranian delegation has every possibility of again addressing the Soviet Government in order to clarify the questions in which it is interested.

In its statement to the Security Council, the Soviet delegation wrote that the Soviet Government could not fail to point out that there had been a recent increase in propaganda hostile to the Soviet Union in Iran, which was obviously tolerated by the Government of Hakimi.

The Soviet delegation wrote that this propaganda was in no way different from the Fascist propaganda that formerly took place against the Soviet Union under Reza Shah. This statement continued:

"Anti-democratic and 'pogrom' activity on the part of reactionary forces in Iran, hostile to the Soviet Union, which is supported by certain influential Iranian groups drawn from the ruling classes and the police authorities, creates for Azerbaijan and for Baku a danger of organized hostile actions, diversions and so forth. Such a situation cannot be tolerated. However, the Soviet Government thinks that such questions which affect the relations between two neighbouring states, the U.S.S.R. and Iran, can and should be settled by means of bilateral negotiations between the Soviet Government and the Iranian Government. The Soviet Government did not and does not refuse to accept this method of settling such disputes arising between neighbours."

I now ask the Security Council if there is any foundation for consideration by the Security Council of the question brought before it by the Iranian Government of Hakimi and the Iranian delegation? I answer: No. There is no such foundation.

This is the actual state of affairs. I would like, however, to consider to what extent the Iranian statement to the Security Council

is justified from the legal point of view, from the point of view of the conformity of this statement of the Iranian delegation with the Charter of the United Nations Organization.

I must analyse the circumstances of this question in connection with Articles 33, 34, 36 and 37 of the Charter. Article 33, paragraph 1, says: "The parties to any dispute, the continuance of which is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security, shall, first of all, seek a solution by negotiation, inquiry . . . et cetera," as mentioned in this article.

Consequently, the Charter of the United Nations requires the Members of the Organization to attempt to settle disputes by means of negotiation, et cetera, and it is even stated in the second part of this article that the Council may call upon the parties to settle their dispute by the means indicated in Article 33.

On comparing the contents of Article 33 with all the circumstances mentioned here by the Iranian delegation, it will become quite obvious that, in the present case, the Security Council cannot call upon the Soviet Union to take any steps provided for by Article 33.

The next article pertaining to this question, Article 34, says:

"The Security Council may investigate any dispute, or any situation which might lead to international friction and give rise to a dispute, in order to determine whether the continuance of the dispute or situation is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security."

It suffices to compare the circumstances mentioned here by the Iranian delegation with Article 34 in order to eliminate any doubt that this article is absolutely inapplicable to the question under consideration, since it relates to a dispute or situation of quite a different order. I will further quote Article 36 of the Charter:

"The Security Council may at any stage of a dispute of the nature referred to in Article 33 or of a like nature, recommend appropriate procedure or methods of adjustment."

This article is also inapplicable in this case since this is not the place for such recommendations, the Soviet Government having expressly stated that it considers the only acceptable means of settling such questions between neighbouring countries to be bilateral negotiation.

Finally Article 37:

"Should the parties to a dispute of the nature referred to in Article 33 fail to settle it by the means indicated in that article, they shall refer it to the Security Council."

This article envisages a situation in which the parties have found themselves unable to come to an agreement. It is quite obvious that,

at present, such a situation does not exist in the relations between the U.S.S.R. and Iran and consequently, there is no foundation for the application of Article 37 of the Charter.

The analysis of the above-mentioned articles of the Charter undoubtedly proves that the Security Council has no grounds for considering the substance of the Iranian delegation's statement. The Soviet delegation suggests that the Soviet Union and Iran should be given the opportunity to settle this matter.

In submitting this proposal, the Soviet delegation has in view the interest of good-neighbourly relations among Members of the Organization and thus the Organization itself, the interest of strengthening international co-operation, based on mutual confidence, mutual good will and an endeavour to strengthen unity and friendship within the Organization of the United Nations.

Speeches by the Delegates of Iran, the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom, 30th January, 1946

MR. TAQIZADEH (Iran): I wish to confine myself to making only two remarks in reply to the statement made by the Soviet delegate in the last session. I would reply to those points which are relevant to the substance of the matter and I will not enter into any discussion with regard to other points and references or allusions to the change in the administration in Iran, as well as similar matters.

The substance of the statement of the Soviet delegate was based on two points: first, that there has been negotiation between Iran and the Soviet Union and it was concluded or ended with an expression of satisfaction from Iran at the result obtained; and, secondly, that since there has been negotiations between the two parties, the matter could not be brought to the Council in accordance with the procedure provided in the Charter. I must say that the Iranian delegation contests both points and is of opinion that the arguments of the Soviet delegate do not show the ground.

In the first place, that is, relating to the first matter, as the question is explained fully and clearly in the memorandum of the Iranian delegation presented to the Security Council, the history of the Notes exchanged between Iran and the Soviet Union with regard to the recent events is as follows.

After the rebellion in Azerbaijan, the Iranian Government sent security forces for reinforcement on 18th November and communicated in a Note to the Soviet Government first a list of a good many interferences in the internal affairs of Iran, and in the second place they asked for the freedom of action and movement of those Iranian forces sent to Azerbaijan and that the Soviet Government should not interfere with them.

Nevertheless, the Iranian security forces were halted eighteen miles from Teheran by the Soviet military authorities and could not proceed, and they stayed there. The Iranian Government, on 22nd and 23rd November, sent two Notes to the Soviet Government asking for immediate and urgent instructions to be sent to the military authorities to cease this intervention and let the Iranian security force proceed on its way.

The Soviet Government replied on 26th November and denied all those interferences which were enumerated in the Iranian Note, but said explicitly that similar interferences would not take place. But the Soviet authorities refused to let the Iranian security forces proceed; and so the Iranian Government, in reply to this Note of the Soviet Government, since the main and immediate object was to secure that the Iranian security force would proceed to Azerbaijan, stated that at this stage they did not want to go into the past interferences which the Soviet Government denied. As the Soviet Government in its Note said that there would not be any interference, the Iranian Government again insisted that the security forces going to Azerbaijan should be allowed to proceed.

The text of this Note is in Persian, and here it is before my eyes, and I think I know the Persian language well enough to be able to say that in this Note there is no trace of an expression of satisfaction either of the fact that the Soviet Government denied the interferences in the past or of their rejection of the Iranian request for the security forces to proceed. It will be easy to put before the Council these letters, which are in Persian, in order to have them examined by impartial experts; and you have already seen the translations in the memorandum which the Iranian delegation presented the other day to the Council.

But, apart from all this, may we not bring to bear on this matter the common sense of the members of the Council? Is it at all possible or conceivable that a foreign power would write to another country, which complains that all they have said is untrue and say that the request to allow the security forces to proceed is rejected, and then the aggrieved country turn round and say "Thank you"?

The Soviet Government considers this to be negotiation, and that the rejection of the request and the promise that interference would not take place in the future is a happy resolution of the so-called negotiation. I would like to leave the judgment of this matter to the common sense of the Council.

As to the second point of the Soviet delegate, that this is a procedural matter and that there has been direct negotiation going on, and therefore in accordance with Article 33 of the Charter the

matter cannot be brought before the Council, I must say that I think that Article 33 says that the parties to the dispute must first of all seek a solution by negotiation.

We have sought that negotiation and we went so far in that direction that the Iranian Prime Minister and the Minister for Foreign Affairs offered to go to Moscow to negotiate, not only at the time of the conference of the Three Powers in Moscow, as was said by the Soviet delegate, but even before that time and also later, in a Note sent to the Soviet Embassy, and once again in a speech delivered in the Iranian Parliament on 18th December, a copy of which was sent to the Soviet Embassy with a Note on 21st December.

The offer was repeated in a Note dated 14th December to the Soviet Embassy in Teheran which expressly said that the Iranian Government, before learning of the forthcoming conference of the Foreign Ministers in Moscow, proposed through the Ambassador in Moscow that the Prime Minister and the Minister for Foreign Affairs should go to Moscow and get in contact with the Soviet statesmen.

But all this was of no avail; it was all ignored. In the end, no direct negotiations for the settlement of this dispute took place at all. The notes of the Iranian Government requesting that their forces be allowed to enter this territory and the notes of the Soviet Government rejecting this request cannot be called "direct negotiations" which have given results.

Therefore, if the Soviet delegate says that there has been no seeking of direct negotiations for a settlement of the matter, I say that that is not true, because, as I have explained, we have sought direct negotiations with no avail. But if he wants to say that the negotiations had already begun, and those notes for the request and the rejection are negotiations, even if one assumed that that is so, I say that there has been no result. Therefore, from whatever angle you look at the matter, you will find that the conditions, the preliminary requisite of bringing the matter before the Council, are in order.

In conclusion, I would like to say that, now that this dispute has come before the Council and has found a place in its agenda, it cannot be dismissed and must not be dismissed; under no circumstances must it go out of the hands of the Council; it must be pursued.

If, as the Soviet delegate said at the conclusion of his statement, the Soviet Union are ready for direct negotiations for the settlement of this dispute, we will be prepared to take part in direct negotiations, if the Council recommend this procedure to be taken. We have always tried in the past and have always wished to get into direct

negotiations. But now this procedure should be adopted according to a recommendation of the Council, and in accordance with the procedure laid down in the Charter.

The Council should take this matter under its jurisdiction and negotiations should proceed under its ægis, and progress should be reported to the Council from time to time, results being reported to them within a reasonable lapse of time. In this way we are ready to get into direct negotiations with the Soviet Union; but, as I say, under no circumstances are we prepared to let the matter go out of the hands of the Council.

The PRESIDENT: I invite the representative of the Soviet Union to speak.

MR. VYSHINSKY (Soviet Union): I carefully followed the second statement in the Security Council by Mr. Taqizadeh, Head of the Iranian delegation, on behalf of the Iranian Government.

I do not wish to follow the path taken by the representative of the Iranian delegation because it would mean, in the first place, repeating what has been already said, and repetition is not always instructive in spite of the well-known school proverb; in the second place, it would mean marking time on the same spot without any hope of going forward.

Nevertheless, I must deal again with a number of important points which were mentioned to-day by the representative of Iran.

On the last occasion I raised two fundamental questions: Did any negotiations take place and what were their results? To-day the Iranian representative states that in fact there were negotiations but not direct negotiations. In that case I would ask, what were those negotiations? If they were not direct, they must have taken place through the intermediary of some other person or institution or State. I am not aware that during November questions of interest to the Iranian Government and naturally of interest also to the Soviet Government were considered through the intermediary of any other agencies, persons or States. On the contrary, I can confirm that on the basis of those same documents, which were so copiously supplied by the Iranian delegation to the Security Council, those negotiations did take place between the Soviet Government and the Iranian Government without intermediaries. Now, negotiations taking place without intermediaries are direct negotiations. I will not, however, dwell on this aspect of the matter because, in short, it is unimportant whether the negotiations were direct or indirect. The fact is that there were negotiations. The fact that these negotiations took place by means of an exchange of notes, on the one hand, and with the assistance of our Ambassador in Tcheran and Mr. Ahi, the Iranian Ambassador in Moscow, on the

other hand, in no way alters the position; on the contrary, it serves as further proof that such negotiations took place. It seems to me that there is no necessity to waste time on denying such completely obvious facts, which are proved even by the very documents submitted by the Iranian delegation.

The second question was: Were these negotiations successful, did they lead to any result?

I referred to the note of 1st December. I am prepared to use only the Iranian text, that is to say, the text submitted by the Iranian delegation as an annex and distributed to the members of the Security Council. However, I cannot disregard the facts, which speak for themselves. Of course, a number of such puzzling questions can be imagined; for instance, it might happen that an interested State would say: "Your complaint is not just, but I am nevertheless grateful to you," as Mr. Taqizadeh said. But the fact remains that the Note of 1st December (and I am going to quote this text from the copy supplied by the Iranian delegation) makes the following statement:

"In reply to the communication in which you answer that the charge made concerning interference by Soviet officials in our internal affairs in the Northern Provinces are unfounded, the Ministry for Foreign Affairs does not wish at this time to give further explanations in this matter, and to throw more light on the antecedents of the case. It takes note with satisfaction of the purport of your statement to the effect that henceforth such incidents will not happen again."

I do not want to argue. I am ready to accept this text as it is. I do not want to argue about words, I do not want to argue about philology, for philology here may be set aside. The text which we received and translated was verified by us for several days by means of telegraphic correspondence through Moscow with our Embassy in Iran.

This passage reads as follows:

"The Ministry for Foreign Affairs expresses its satisfaction at the contents of your reply in which you state that the interference of Soviet officials in the internal affairs of the Northern Regions of Iran is not in accordance with the facts, since the Ministry for Foreign Affairs does not wish at this time to give more detailed explanations in this matter and throw full light on past circumstances, and also on account of the fact that it is clear from your statements that the actions in question will not occur again in future. The Ministry for Foreign Affairs also expresses its satisfaction at your statement to the effect that the Soviet officials fully respect the provisions of the Trilateral Treaty and the Declaration of the three Allied Powers which are allies of Iran, signed and published in Teheran."

This passage is in complete agreement with the Note presented by the Iranian delegation, which states: "Your assurance that the Soviet Government fully respects the terms of the Treaty and the declarations signed in Teheran is also a source of satisfaction."

I do not know whether the words written in the official document should be trusted or not. Whether the Iranian text or our translation of that text is taken, one thing can be said. As a result of the correspondence and negotiations which took place during November between the Soviet Government and the Iranian Government, as a result of the examination of the explanations presented by the Soviet Government through their Embassy in Teheran to the Iranian Government, in the Note of 26th November, 1945, the Iranian Government evidently made up its mind as follows: The Soviet Government states that the Treaty will be respected by its officials and representatives. It denies, it is true, these facts, but in view of the existence of an assurance that the incidents will not happen again, it is unnecessary to go further into the considerations of all these petty disputes; it is necessary to bring them to an end and look to the future. In this sense, I affirm that the Iranian Government's answer of 1st December undoubtedly expressed satisfaction at the Soviet Government's Note of 26th November. It was a realistic approach. It was not an approach of disputants who would insist at any cost on arguing abstractly on the question of what is truth and what is not truth; it was a realistic approach. You say that there were no such incidents and we say there were. But we take note of the fact that the Treaty is respected. We agree to stop on this point. Such a course of the discussion is realistic. Such understanding gives grounds for the statement that the Iranian Government's answer of 1st December bears the traces of satisfaction which unfortunately the representative of the Iranian delegation here has overlooked.

I ask the Security Council to remember that the Soviet Government, and the Soviet delegation which expresses here the opinion of the Soviet Government and acts on its instructions, puts the following question:

"Were there or were there not misunderstandings?"

We deny it. The Iranian Government denies our denial. Up to 1st December a certain balance was struck and a halt was called at that point. The Iranian Government, and I emphasize this, previously stated: "We do not want to deal further with this question and we do not wish to revert to the antecedents of this matter." This, of course, gave the Soviet Government every right to consider that the Iranian Government was satisfied with the result. This can be judged from the Note of 1st December.

In the Note of 1st December, the question once again arose regarding the necessity of sending additional Iranian troops to

Northern Iran. But it was necessary to bear in mind the actual circumstances under which that question arose. They were as follows: firstly, the Soviet Government regarded the events which were taking place in the territory of Northern Iran as having no connection whatever with the presence of Soviet troops in the district. The events in Northern Iran did not arise as a result of the presence there of some Soviet officials and military who were interfering in the internal affairs of Iran. Such allegations could not stand the slightest criticism. It goes without saying that conservative and reactionary elements are always inclined to regard all events of this kind in their country as a result of the interference in their internal affairs by a foreign power.

But did matters in Northern Iran actually take place in this way? It would not be difficult to prove that events in Northern Iran have nothing to do with the presence there of Soviet forces. These were internal Iranian events. And it is known that the essence of these events was that, in Northern Iran, there was a question of national autonomy within the limits of the Iranian State, of desires and aspirations among the local Azerbaijan population, desires in which there is nothing unusual in any democratic country. What have the Soviet troops to do with them?

The Iranian Government states that it wished to bring in additional troops, but that the Soviet Government had opposed this. This is true. In Northern Iran are stationed one infantry regiment, two infantry brigades and two regiments of gendarmerie, a most imposing police array. Are not these forces sufficient to restore order in this district? This was how the Soviet Government envisaged this question and in its replies to the inquiries of the American and British Governments, through Mr. Harriman and Sir Archibald Clark Kerr, the Soviet Government stated that these forces were amply sufficient provided, of course, that the local Iranian authorities themselves did not provoke the local population by their actions. These brigades, regiments and gendarmerie were fully sufficient to restore order in the district if the Iranian authorities themselves were able and willing to do so. Will not the introduction of additional Iranian troops into the country place both sides in a difficult position? There are Soviet troops in Northern Persia in accordance with an agreement between the Iranian and Soviet Governments concluded in 1942. The Soviet troops could not, of course, permit a massacre to take place before their eyes as a result of the provocative action of the authorities. This was how this question was envisaged. I believe that this was a legitimate view of this question. And I maintain that, in its notes after 1st December, the Government of Iran addressed itself to the Soviet Government, not in respect of interference in the internal affairs of Iran, but

with a view to taking advantage of the Moscow Conference of the three Foreign Ministers in order to consider certain questions concerning Iran (and I must stress this) not only of Soviet troops concerning which the Iranian Government had written in its Notes of 13th and 14th December, but of the withdrawal of all foreign troops.

It must be borne in mind that, at the Conference of the three Foreign Ministers in Moscow, the Iranian question was not discussed. On about the last day before the Conference closed, on 26th December, it was finally established that the Iranian question would not be discussed. Since the representative of the Iranian Government desired to be present in Moscow for the purpose of discussing the Iranian question, and this question was not discussed, there was no necessity for the attendance of such representative. Possibly the Iranian Government is displeased that Mr. Hakimi was not given the possibility of going to Moscow? But the Hakimi Government was following a line which supported a movement in Iran hostile to the Soviet Union; we mentioned this in our Notes and I spoke of it in the Security Council on 24th January.

To be brief, I come to the last conclusive statement of the representative of the Iranian delegation. He stated that the Iranian delegation did not oppose direct negotiations between the Soviet Union and the Iranian Government. This, of course, is also in accordance with our wishes, as I stated on 24th January, as I declared at the last meeting and as I am in a position to declare here and now. The Iranian delegation however, imposes the condition that the Security Council should not let this matter go out of its hands, that it should follow and control the course of the negotiations, and be informed of their result. If the position is that the Soviet Union, in its actions, must be placed under some special supervision by the Security Council, I reject it as incompatible with the position of the Soviet Union amongst the other powers of the world, as incompatible with its dignity as a member of the Security Council, and as incompatible with the dignity of the United Nations Organization. I consider that if the Iranian Government is not, in fact, at the present time engaged here in fencing with the Soviet Union, but seeks a wise and healthy solution of this question, bi-lateral negotiations should be agreed upon, which, given good will on the part of the Soviet and Iranian Governments, may remove the existing misunderstandings between them. That good intentions on the part of the Soviet Government are there, I can guarantee, and I think that there is no reason why the Iranian Government should assume a different attitude. There is no justification for talking about any conditions, especially as the Security Council exists permanently

as an active organ of the United Nations which has every possibility, under the Charter, of exercising the rights granted to it by the Charter.

That is all.

The PRESIDENT: The representative of Iran has indicated that there has been a mis-statement of words attributed to him, and he would like to make that particular correction. In regard to this matter, I would ask the assent of the Council as to whether he should have the right to make that correction. If an opportunity for personal explanation is afforded by the Council, I feel that it should only deal with the matter to which the mis-statement actually applies, and that no fresh matter must be introduced at this stage in any statement that is to be made. Is that the wish of the Council? If there is no objection, I will ask the delegate for Iran to make that correction.

MR. TAQIZADEH (Iran): In accordance with your wishes, I will not go into the matter. In reply to the different points raised by the Soviet delegation, I understand from the English and French translations which I have followed, that the Soviet delegate said I admitted that there has been a negotiation; but I do not admit ever having said such a thing as that.

I said the Charter provided that the parties should *seek* negotiations, should seek a solution by negotiations, and we have sought without avail and without result. In another place I said, only by supposition, that, even if one assumed that negotiations had taken place, that does not mean anything as it has brought no result. Again, the matter could be brought before the Security Council even if there had been any negotiation without result; but I never admitted that there had been negotiation.

I repeat again that the act of writing a note to someone and requesting them to allow our own troops to go to our own territory for the purpose of pacification, and getting a reply saying that the question of whether troops are needed there or not needed there is not for the Iranian Government to decide, but that somebody else must see if that is necessary or not, and there and then the request being refused by them: I cannot see how that can be considered "negotiation."

MR. VYSHINSKY (Soviet Union): It seems to me that the problem lies clear, and I do not wish to make any statement.

The PRESIDENT: The matter is now open for discussion and for such proposals as the Council may think proper.

MR. BEVIN (United Kingdom): This dispute between these two Governments has arisen in pursuance of the carrying out of a Treaty

to which the United Kingdom Government is a party, as well as the two Governments concerned; and the essential paragraph in that Treaty is Article 4, and I propose to read it:

"The Allied Powers may maintain in Iranian territory land, sea and air forces in such numbers as they consider necessary. The location of such forces shall be decided in agreement with the Iranian Government so long as the strategic situation allows. All questions concerning the relations between the forces of the Allied Powers and the Iranian authorities shall be settled, so far as possible, in co-operation with the Iranian authorities in such a way as to safeguard the security of the said forces. It is understood that the presence of these forces on Iranian territory does not constitute a military occupation and will disturb as little as possible the administration and the security forces of Iran, the economic life of the country, the normal movements of the population and the application of Iranian laws and regulations."

In that paragraph, the High Contracting Parties undertake to leave the sovereignty, the administration, the movement of security forces, the police, and everything, to the sole judgment of the Iranian Government. I was a little perturbed when I heard Mr. Vyshinsky say that it was the Soviet Government that decided that the number of police and soldiers in Azerbaijan was sufficient to keep order, because under this Treaty the sole judge of that, in our view, as a party to the Treaty, was the Iranian Government, and no one else. The Treaty also said that we would withdraw our forces six months after the end of hostilities, which is 2nd March. No other Treaty, no other powers, nothing else, was taken into account in arriving at this Treaty.

In fact, I ought to say, speaking for my Government, that we felt a sense of gratitude, at very dire moments when the war was at its worst, that the Iranian Government placed their territory, their citizens and their communications at the disposal of the Allies, and our feeling is very strongly that if we entered a territory for the purpose of conducting the war against Germany, and later against Japan, we have even a greater duty than the Treaty lays down; and it is to make sure not only that we preserve the integrity of the country that placed its territory at our disposal, but that we hand it back intact, with our forces gone and without interference with its sovereignty.

Therefore, the question arises, has the sovereignty of the Iranian Government been infringed? This is where the evidence is a little conflicting. According to the Iranian Government, as I read the documents, having this internal difficulty arising in Azerbaijan, a similar difficulty historically to that which happened under the Government of Russia in the early part of 1914, they proceeded,

within their rights as a sovereign nation responsible for internal order, to take such steps as they deemed necessary to protect their nationals and protect order.

Now, on the admission of Mr. Vyshinsky, by the authority of the High Command of Soviet Russia, they were stopped. What is there to negotiate about? Were they in fact stopped? If they were, then there was an infringement of this Treaty, and I do not think there is any answer to that. The Treaty is perfectly clear. And what is to be the result of such negotiations? What is there to decide?

I have been listening to this discussion for all these days, and as I read the claim made by the Iranian Government, it is that the Tripartite Treaty should be strictly observed, and that the security forces and officials, as appointed by the Iranian Government, should be allowed to do their duty, as ordered by that Government.

I would like to put it to the Soviet delegate, if I may, in the friendliest fashion: is that denied to the Iranian Government? The Treaty is clear. If my Government had done this and I was charged with it, I should not regard it as a question of dignity for the Council to inquire into it and tell me whether I had done wrong or right. I do not regard that as a question of the dignity of a State, if the Security Council, charged with this matter, has it investigated and indeed makes a pronouncement as to whether you have or have not carried out your obligation under the Treaty.

Personally, I have no objections to discussions between the Soviet Government and the Iranian Government, but I must say to the Council that we, too, are parties to the Treaty. What is going to be decided under this Treaty? I understand that is the only thing under discussion, although in the statement of the Soviet Union they refer to the danger in the Baku oilfields. I cannot imagine the Iranian army or anybody else attacking the Soviet army and endangering the Baku oilfields. I really cannot. I think that is rather an exaggeration. Nor can I really imagine them being unable to maintain sufficient protection against saboteurs or anything referred to in the Soviet statement.

It goes rather deeper than that. We and the United States communicated with the Soviet Government and we did regard the answer as not being conclusive or satisfactory. Now we want to promote peace and there is one thing I would like to say about this. You will, I am perfectly certain, Mr. President, pull me up if I am going astray, but this thing did look to us in this country like a war of nerves. It did really look like the prescription laid down in, and quoted by the Iranian Government from, Mr. Litvinoff's definition of what constituted aggression. I am quite certain if this can be eliminated it will be for the benefit of the peace of the world.

I am quite willing for these discussions to take place, but as a party to the Treaty I would ask the Soviet Government to agree with us to leave it on the agenda. It has been subject to public discussion here and there is another reason, a very sound reason which would apply to my country or to the United States if we were in a similar position. We are powerful countries; we are what is sometimes described as the "Big Three." I certainly am a good physical representative of the Big Three.

But we do represent power and power does count in negotiations. There are armies in Iran. They are there by the kindness of Iran, to whom I am sure every ally, having regard to the victory we have won and the transportation that it represented to us in our very darkest moments, must feel a sense of gratitude. Yet that small Power has to negotiate with an army of I cannot tell how many thousands on her territory at this moment.

But it does seem to me for them to have to negotiate alone, with, shall I say, the watchfulness, the sense of justice and the holding of the balance of this new United Nations Organization at their disposal, would be most unfortunate and would be misunderstood. Indeed, I personally take the view, if I was in this position and it was my Government, with the power, military and economic, that we represent, that was in conflict or dispute or disagreement with any small Power, I should welcome that small Power having at its elbow the assistance of a council of this character.

I can only conclude by saying that I sincerely trust it is not in dispute. We stand for the integrity of Iran, without interference in her sovereignty; for the removal of troops from her territory as quickly as we can and the last man to go by the date we have agreed; for leaving her and her people to work out their political and economic salvation in their own way; and for us, as great Powers, not to sit in judgment upon them as regards their internal affairs.

Therefore, if talks can proceed, and I hope they will, between the two Powers primarily concerned, I sincerely hope we shall not be put in the position of being asked at this stage to take it off the agenda and so leave a small Power negotiating in what I should regard as the most adverse circumstances. Indeed, I should think my own dignity and everything else would be enhanced if I allowed her to nave, in the conduct of those negotiations, all the assistance she required.

MR. STETTINIUS (United States of America): I feel that we all should have a sense of gratification after the full discussion that has taken place on this initial situation that has been brought before the Security Council, and that both parties are willing to negotiate as provided for in the Charter. I do not believe that keeping the matter on the continuing agenda of the Council while

negotiations are in progress until a solution is found, is in any way incompatible with the Charter or the dignity of any of the Council, or any of its members. Moreover, it does not seem to me that the Council can divest itself of its responsibility in the situation which has been brought to its attention.

Cannot the Council agree to permit the two parties to negotiate voluntarily and keep the Council informed until a mutually satisfactory solution is found in accordance with justice?

The PRESIDENT: I should like to say a few words, not as the President of the Council, but in my capacity as the delegate for AUSTRALIA.

The policy of Australia on all these matters is to support the fullest discussion, consideration and investigation of all complaints made by members of the United Nations under the Charter. The action taken by the Security Council in dealing with such matters will profoundly affect its standing in the eyes of the whole world.

At our last meeting several important steps were taken. The representative of Iran (which is not a member of the Council) was invited to take his seat at the table and to make an oral statement, supplementing the written communication sent to the Council by the Iranian delegation. The representative of the Soviet Government was invited to make an oral statement in reply. The adoption of this procedure at a public meeting of the Council is a matter of great importance, since it has been made clear to the world at large that the Council, as soon as its jurisdiction was invoked, took positive steps to deal with the question in issue.

It is now clear that both parties have declared their willingness to negotiate. When, however, the jurisdiction of the Council has been invoked, it is the view of the Australian Government that the Council should remain seized of the matter, so that it will be in a position to deal with it again at a time when it deems it to be appropriate. If, therefore, the Council agrees to defer further consideration of this matter, pending negotiations between the parties, it is the view of my Government that the Council should be kept informed of the progress of these negotiations, and in particular, of the nature of any settlement arrived at between the parties.

An opportunity will then be given for any member of the Council to raise such matters as he deems appropriate, and to bring any proposal before the Council for its consideration. In this way, the world at large will be kept fully informed of the results of the negotiations, and the Council, whose jurisdiction has been invoked, will be able to discuss what further action, if any, the Council itself should take in relation to this question. For these reasons, I am of

the opinion that the matter should be retained on the agenda of the Council until a solution has been found, which we trust will be a speedy and a satisfactory one to all concerned.

MR. VYSHINSKY (Soviet Union): If Mr. Stettinius's proposal, supported by Mr. Bevin, to the effect that this question should remain on the agenda, is adopted, this will mean in fact that the Security Council will have adopted recommendations in respect of the Soviet Union and Iran. But the question of recommendations may only stand if there are grounds under Article 37 of the Charter. Article 37 of the Charter states that the Security Council may recommend such action as it provides for in this recommendation, but in one case only. It is in the case where a continuance of a dispute might actually endanger the maintenance of peace and security. It follows that the position of affairs now existing in the relations between the Soviet Union and Iran is one that endangers peace and security. Only then, and then only can the Security Council adopt such a recommendation which implies this fact in a veiled form by retaining this question on the agenda of the Security Council. I think that, in view of the statements which have been made here and the desires which have been expressed by the Soviet Union, and I am now entitled to believe by Iran also, and supported by a number of members of the Security Council, there are no grounds for the application of Article 37. And, since there are no such grounds, this question should be removed from the agenda of the Security Council, because there is no further need for the Security Council to concern itself with this question, and because there are no judicial or legal grounds for the application of recommendations under Article 37. I fail to understand the need for further amendments or addenda to the simple and reasonable resolution to the effect that the parties be left to settle the dispute concerning their conflicting views by mutual agreement. What reason is there to insist that this matter be retained on the agenda of the Security Council?

In my view, to say, "The question remains on the agenda of the Security Council" is equivalent to saying, "We recommend you to settle this question but if you do not settle it yourselves, it will be settled by the Security Council." But there are no grounds for this course, just as there are no grounds for the application of Article 37; such conditions are non-existent here, because we have no intention of waging war on Iran and Iran has, I believe, no intention of waging war upon us. No incipient act of aggression, of which an unhappy hint has been dropped here by Mr. Bevin, is conceivable. The proposal that the question of Iran should be retained on the agenda of the Security Council arises from and manifests exceptional suspiciousness, that is to say, the very quality which has always

hindered, and still continues to hinder friendly co-operation among the United Nations; it has been a hindrance in the past and it is high time to get rid of it. The first matter for the Security Council and the entire United Nations Organization is to clear the way for mutual understanding and collaboration on the basis of the great principles upon which the Charter of the United Nations is founded.

I am decidedly against this question remaining on the agenda of the Security Council. It must be removed in view of the express agreement regarding a friendly settlement of this question. I am convinced that we shall reach results. Should we fail to reach any results, then any member of the Security Council can come into the Security Council and say—"Give us an account of what you have done to carry out the obligations which you assumed at the meeting on 30th January, 1946."

MR. BEVIN (United Kingdom): Let me assure Mr. Vyshinsky that it is not a question of distrust or anything of that kind. It is trying to keep to our Charter that concerns me. As I understand it, the Iranian delegation referred this problem to us under Article 35, and we are now referring it back for bilateral negotiation. Therefore, it seems to me that the Council, by that act, has not discharged its duty. It has merely adopted a procedure for the settlement of this dispute by bilateral negotiation, and until the report on that bilateral negotiation is sent to us, with the results achieved, in my view it still remains before us under the Charter.

I do not know what answer we should give if we said, "There has been a dispute, we have heard the parties, we have taken their word that they will negotiate, and we have washed our hands of it completely, except for getting a periodic report."

Under Article 36, it seems to me that we are in duty bound to see this thing through. As I understand it, Mr. Vyshinsky accepts my resolution down to the word "negotiations," but he does not accept the words, "The question remains on the agenda." I think that if he looks at it in a reasonable way and without suspicion, he will see that legally we are really carrying out by these words, which were added to my resolution by Mr. Stettinius, our duties under the Charter, and if they are discharged, then the question will go off the agenda. I sincerely hope that the thought will not occur to Mr. Vyshinsky that we are putting forward a resolution of this character out of any distrust of either Government. We are trying to carry out the obligations imposed upon us.

MR. TAQIZADEH (Iran): It has been said several times here that both parties agreed to enter into negotiations. I made it clear in my statement that we agreed to negotiate and we wish to negotiate

provided that the matter in dispute remains before the Council. I cannot think that that is a formality and even if it is a formality, if it is taken off the agenda we have had the experience always that that is to the detriment of the small country. I cannot think there would be any harm to the Soviet Union if the matter stays on the agenda, but there may be harm to us if it is taken off the agenda—and it is not only us, it is you. The world would take it that the small nation's appeal is dismissed. Therefore, I would like to ask the Soviet delegate to agree to let it stay on the agenda, because there would be no harm in it and I sincerely wish that we should come to an agreement and report back to the Council what the conclusion is.

MR. BEVIN (United Kingdom): Mr. Chairman, as the most conciliatory man in the room, I would like to ask Mr. Vyshinsky a question. If we put a full stop at the word "negotiations," and take out the words "The question will remain on its agenda," does he agree (this is the question) does he agree that if the progress of the negotiations is not satisfactory, the matter can be discussed by the Security Council?

MR. VYSHINSKY (Soviet Union): It seems to me in the first instance that this question is largely hypothetical because I do not conceive that this comparatively simple matter, which, it is true, has occupied so much of the Security Council's time, should not be settled by us. But if, unexpectedly, owing to other circumstances or to the interference of some hot-heads, results are lacking, then I can thus answer Mr. Bevin's question, "Yes, in accordance with the terms of the Charter."

MR. BEVIN (United Kingdom): The resolution then would read as follows—shall I read it?

"The Council,

"Having heard the statements by the representatives of the Soviet Union and Iran in the course of its meetings of 28th and 30th January, and

"Having taken cognizance of the documents presented by the Soviet and Iranian delegations and those referred to in the course of the oral debates;

"Considering that both parties have affirmed their readiness to seek a solution of the matter at issue by negotiation; and such negotiations will be resumed in the near future,

"Requests the parties to inform the Council of any results achieved in such negotiations. The Council in the meanwhile retains the right at any time to request information on the progress of the negotiations."

MR. STETTINIUS (United States of America): As I think I was the one who insisted on the words "remaining on the agenda," I wish to make my position clear at this time in relation to Mr. Bevin's recent proposal. I am willing to accept Mr. Bevin's proposal with the understanding that this matter remains a continuing concern of the Council until a settlement is reached in conformity with the purposes and principles of the Charter.

The PRESIDENT: The proposal now before the chair is that one which is proposed by the delegate for the United Kingdom. I will ask: are there any objections? Then the resolution is adopted and unanimously.

APPENDIX V

MR. ANTHONY EDEN'S SPEECH IN THE HOUSE OF COMMONS, 20TH AUGUST, 1945

"Then I come to another country farther away, about which I want to speak for a few moments if the House will bear with me, because I regard it as a country of great importance because of the special responsibility we have undertaken there. That is Persia. In 1941 Persia became suddenly, as a result of Germany's attack on Russia, a most important strategic area. She was on our lines of communication, and the only route open to us to save the Arctic route, the full story of which has never yet been told—a superb piece of gallantry by the Royal Navy and the Merchant Marine. Save for that, we had no route except through Persia. The Germans were fully aware of that, and did everything they could to sabotage our attempts to get supplies through that country. The result was a diplomatic duel, long fought out until the Treaties made between us and Persia and between the Soviet Union and Persia by which we got permission to station troops over the period of the war, and a number other facilities, in return for which we undertook to respect the integrity of Persia and withdraw as soon as fighting was over.

"Persia has loyally carried out these Treaties by us and the Soviet Government and, therefore, for some time past, I have been anxious that we should begin to do our part of the bargain. Although, strictly speaking, we were not called upon to withdraw until hostilities were over, we did recognize as long ago as the Crimea Conference, my right hon. friend and I, that such a beginning should be made and it was agreed that the first withdrawal should take place at Teheran, both by us and by the Russians. It was further agreed that further stages of the withdrawal should be discussed at the Foreign Secretaries' meeting next month. I certainly think that it would be good if they were so discussed, because the Japanese war is now over, and there is no object for any of us to stay in Persia any longer; and certainly this country would like us to get out as rapidly as possible. We have only one interest in Persia

and that is to see that country prosperous, united and strong, and the last thing we want is a recurrence of the practice of zones of influence and matters of that kind which there were in Persia long ago, and which made us so intensely unpopular in that country for a generation. I hope that the policy of withdrawal will be carried out by the Allies and carried out rapidly."

APPENDIX VI

MR. ERNEST BEVIN'S STATEMENT IN THE HOUSE OF COMMONS, 10TH OCTOBER, 1945

"The House will remember that the question of Persia was discussed at Potsdam, and that an arrangement was made for the immediate withdrawal of Allied forces from Teheran. The British withdrawal under this arrangement has now been almost completed and M. Molotov has assured me that the decision regarding the withdrawal of troops from Teheran has been put into effect from the Soviet side. It was also agreed at Potsdam that the question of further stages in the withdrawal of Allied troops from Persia should be discussed at the first meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers. Since Potsdam, of course, the position has been changed by the ending of the Japanese war, which automatically brings into effect the provision of the Anglo-Soviet-Persian Treaty that British and Soviet troops will complete their withdrawal from Persia within six months of the end of hostilities. But since the question was on the Agenda of the Council, I thought it as well to make His Majesty's views on the matter quite clear, and I therefore wrote the following letter to Mr. Molotov:

" 'Since it was decided at Potsdam that the question of further stages in the withdrawal of Allied troops from Persia should be placed on the Agenda of the Council of Foreign Ministers, the situation has been changed by the ending of the Japanese war. Our two Governments will now be completing the withdrawal of their forces from Persia by 2nd March, 1946, six months after the signing of the Japanese Instrument of Surrender and, as far as the end of our withdrawal is concerned, all that we need to do is to ask the Council to take note of the 2nd March, 1946, as the date fixed.

" 'It seems to me, however, that since our respective forces in Persia have completed the war-time tasks for which they were sent to Persia, our Governments might well see if they could not do something to satisfy the Persia Government's natural desire to see as much of its territory as possible freed as soon as possible from the presence of foreign forces.

" 'I, therefore, propose to suggest when the question comes up at the Council of Foreign Ministers, that our two Governments shall agree that by the middle of December, 1945, their respective forces

shall be withdrawn from the whole of Persia except that British forces may remain until the 2nd March, 1946, in the southern oil area to the south of, and including, Andimishk, and that Soviet forces may remain until the 2nd March, 1946, in Azerbaijan. I should propose excepting from this arrangement the minimum administrative staffs necessary for disposing of military installations; these staffs could remain where there are such installations until they had arranged for their disposal; they would, of course, be withdrawn like our other forces, by the 2nd March, 1946. I have thought it well to let you know in advance of my intention to put forward this proposal, when the matter comes up at the Council of Foreign Ministers.'

"To this M. Molotov replied in the following letter: 'Thank you for informing me in your letter of 19th September of the British Government's attitude on the question of the withdrawal of British and Soviet troops from Iran. I must in turn inform you that the decision of the Berlin Three Power Conference regarding the withdrawal of troops from Teheran has already been put into effect from the Soviet side. As regards the complete withdrawal of Soviet troops from Iran, the Soviet Government, as you are aware, take the view that this withdrawal of troops should be effected within the period laid down in the Anglo-Soviet-Iranian Treaty. If necessary, the plan for the official withdrawal of Soviet and British forces from Iran could be discussed between us towards the end of the said period. The Soviet Government, accordingly, see no need for this question to be discussed at the Council of Foreign Ministers.'

"As a result of this exchange of letters, which underlines the intention of both British and Soviet Governments to stand by their Treaty obligations to Persia, when the question came up before the Council of 22nd September, M. Molotov and I informed the Council that the exchange of letters had taken place. The Council took note of the fact that the letters on this matter had been exchanged between us and agreed that in view of this there was no necessity for the question of the withdrawal of troops from Iran to be discussed, and that the item should, therefore, be removed from the Agenda of the Conference.

"In a further letter I wrote to M. Molotov as follows: 'I am glad that we have reached so cordial an understanding on the question of the withdrawal of Allied troops from Persia, about which I wrote to you on 19th September and you replied on 20th September. I am sorry that, owing to a doubt in the translation, there was some misunderstanding about the intention of your letter. The difference in language certainly creates problems for us.' My

¹ There was a misunderstanding owing to the Russian text of Mr. Molotov's first letter being translated to read "on the expiry," whereas the correct translation was "towards the end."

colleagues were pleased to learn from me of the complete agreement between us as to the date by which Allied troops should be withdrawn, that is, by 2nd March, 1946, six months after the signing of the Japanese surrender on 2nd September, 1945. His Majesty's Government are issuing a direction to the British military authorities accordingly.'

"M. Molotov then replied: 'I am glad that the letter which I sent you on 20th September has given you satisfaction. I would like to tell you once again that in the case of the Soviet Government, the question of withdrawing troops from Iran did not in general constitute a special problem, inasmuch as there is a Treaty which makes provision for it. I would ask you to bear in mind that the Soviet Government attach exceptional importance to the strict fulfilment of obligations undertaken.'"

APPENDIX VII

MR. ERNEST BEVIN'S STATEMENT BEFORE THE SECURITY COUNCIL, 1ST FEBRUARY, 1946

"In fact, I ought to say, speaking for my Government, that we felt a sense of gratitude, at very dire moments when the war was at its worst, that the Iranian Government placed their territory, their citizens and their communications at the disposal of the Allies, and our feeling is very strongly that if we entered a territory for the purpose of conducting the war again Germany, and later against Japan, we have even a greater duty than the Treaty lays down; and it is to make sure not only that we preserve the integrity of the country that placed its territory at our disposal, but that we hand it back intact, with our forces gone and without interference with its sovereignty."

